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GROUNDS AND PROCEDURES FOR ATTACKING REAL
PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENTS IN MINNESOTA
Disputes concerning the valuation of real estate for property tax pur-
poses generate a surprising amount of litigation in Minnesota each
year. This specialized area of the law has been given little attention by
Minnesota commentators, yet the procedural and substantive prob-
lems that arise can be quite complex. The complexities in large part
are the result of an antiquated and uncoordinated statutory scheme
and of unauthorized practices by government assessors. The Minnesota
Supreme Court and Legislature have taken steps in recent years to
remedy these problems, but in so doing have created other problems
that must be resolved. This Note analyzes present Minnesota property
tax assessment law and suggests changes necessary to eradicate exist-
ing complexities and inequities. The substantive grounds for attacking
assessments, including overvaluation, inequality, and illegality, are
discussed in detail. Moreover, the numerous procedures available for
objecting to assessments, which are set forth in a random fashion in the
statutes, are collected here in a manner that should assist the
practitioner.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Valuation of real estate for property tax purposes in Minnesota is an
area that receives little attention from legal commentators,, but the
volume and complexity of the cases involving real property tax assess-
ments indicate the need for a thorough review of this area.2 In Minne-
sota, the substantive and procedural problems that can arise in litiga-
tion over property tax assessments often are subtle and difficult to re-
solve. The Minnesota Legislature, through periodic enactments, has
developed a statutory scheme that frequently is confusing, disorganized,
and conflicting.' The purpose of this Note is to analyze that statutory
scheme, and the interpretations given it by the Minnesota Supreme
Court, in a manner that will render it more understandable to the Min-
nesota practitioner. First, for background purposes, this Note will pre-
1. For exceptions, see Johnson, Administrative Procedures in the Minnesota Depart-
ment of Taxation, 41 MINN. L. Rzv. 435 (1957); The Minnesota Supreme Court, 1964-65,
50 MINN. L. REv. 479, 551-58 (1966).
2. In most years at least two cases concerning property tax assessments reach the
Minnesota Supreme Court. Compare, e.g., Halla v. County of Hennepin, 306 Minn. 533,
237 N.W.2d 348 (1975) (per curiam) and Hedberg & Sons v. County of Hennepin, 305
Minn. 80, 232 N.W.2d 743 (1975) with State v. Fridley Recreation & Serv. Co., 288 Minn.
218, 179 N.W.2d 172 (1970) and Alstores Realty, Inc. v. State, 286 Minn. 343, 176 N.W.2d
112 (1970). Moreover, there were 1,091 pending tax cases, most of them involving property
tax assessments, in Hennepin County as of August 11, 1977. See Minutes of the Special
Meeting of the Judges of District Court, Hennepin County, Minnesota (August 11, 1977).
See also Phipps, Proving Overassessments in Property Taxes, 44 FLA. B.J. 446, 450 (1970)
(approximately 22,000 petitions for reduction of property assessments filed in Dade
County, Florida in 1970).
3. Compare, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 270.22 (1976) (decision of state commissioner of reve-
nue can be appealed to Minnesota Supreme Court) with, e.g., id. § 271.06 (1976 & Supp.
1977) (decision of state commissioner of revenue can be appealed to state tax court), as
amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 672, § 4, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 424 (West).
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sent an overview of the general Minnesota statutory approach to prop-
erty taxation.' Then the various grounds for objecting to property tax
assessments will be analyzed,5 followed by a discussion of the numerous
procedures available for objecting to assessments.' Finally, suggestions
will be made as to how Minnesota law on property tax assessments can
be improved and simplified.!
11. AN OVERVIEW OF THE MINNESOTA PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM
The assessment, levy, and collection of real property taxes in Minne-
sota are governed primarily by chapters 270 through 284 of Minnesota
Statutes.8 Under these statutes the commissioner of revenue has the
responsibility for supervising the property taxation process and ensuring
that the local assessors perform their duties correctly,9 but the actual
determination of assessments is made principally by local assessors and
boards of review and equalization. 0
The property tax process commences with the assessment by the local
assessor. The term "assessment" refers to the valuation of real estate for
property tax purposes." Every parcel of real property within the state
must have its value assessed for property tax purposes at least once
every four years. The property is appraised with reference to its market
value as of the January 2 preceding the assessment." The local assessor
4. See notes 8-50 infra and accompanying text.
5. See notes 51-210 infra and accompanying text.
6. See notes 211-300 infra and accompanying text.
7. See notes 301-25 infra and accompanying text.
8. The subjects governed by the chapters are as follows:
chapter 270: the department of revenue generally;
chapter 271: the Minnesota Tax Court;
chapter 272: general provisions on property taxation;
chapter 273: the listing and assessment of property taxes;
chapter 274: the review, equalization, and correction of property tax assessments;
chapter 275: the levy and extension of property taxes;
chapter 276: the collection, accounting, and distribution of property taxes;
chapter 277: delinquent personal property taxes;
chapter 278: objections and defenses to real property taxes;
chapter 279: delinquent real property taxes;
chapter 280: real property tax judgment sales;
chapter 281: redemption following real property tax judgment sales;
chapter 282: tax-forfeited land sales;
chapter 283: refunding property taxes;
chapter 284: actions involving tax titles.
9. See MINN. STAT. § 270.06(1) (Supp. 1977).
10. Id. § 273.08 (1976) (local assessor shall determine market value of all real property
within his jurisdiction at least once every four years); id. § 274.01 (1976 & Supp. 1977)
(local board of review shall review the valuations made by the local assessor); id. § 274.13
(county board of equalization shall review valuations made by local assessors and exam-
ined by local board of review).
11. See, e.g., Fichtner v. Schiller, 271 Minn. 263, 266-67, 135 N.W.2d 877, 879-80 (1965).
12. MINN. STAT. §§ 273.01, .08 (1976).
13. Id. § 273.01. See Stoltzmann v. County of Ramsey, - Minn. - , 251 N.W.2d
19781
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must complete the assessment list, which contains the valuation of each
parcel of taxable property within his jurisdiction, 4 at least two weeks
prior to the meeting date of the local board of review. 5
The local board of review" meets between April 1 and June 30 to
review the assessments made by the local assessor." The board of review
is required to determine whether all parcels of taxable property have
been included on the assessment list and valued at market value and
to hear and resolve complaints from taxpayers concerning valuation or
classification of their property." Between July 1 and July 151' the assess-
ment list is reviewed by the county board of equalization, which hears
grievances and equalizes the valuation of the property assessed by the
various taxing districts within the county." Finally, on August 1522 the
state board of equalization " reviews all the assessment lists within the
state and equalizes them so that, at least theoretically, all property
within the state is assessed at market value. 24 Unless an appeal is
taken,'2 the determination of the state board of equalization establishes
the market value of each parcel of taxable real property in the state.26
The amount of property tax payable depends upon both the taxable
value of the property and the levy by the various taxing authorities.
2
To determine taxable value, the property's market value, limited mar-
ket value, and property tax classification first must be established. Mar-
ket value basically means the usual selling price of the property. 2 Lim-
130 (1977) (taxpayer whose property was damaged by fire after the January 2 assessment
date cannot have the property's valuation for that year lowered as a result).
14. See MiNN. STAT. § 273.03(1) (1976).
15. Id. § 273.01.
16. MINN. STAT. § 274.01(1)(a) (Supp. 1977) provides that the town board of each town
and the city council of each city, except a city whose charter provides for a board of
equalization, shall constitute the board of review; however, MINN. STAT. § 274.01(2) (1976)
also provides that the governing body of any city, including cities whose charters provide
for. a board of equalization, may create a special board of review in lieu of the board of
review provided for in section 274.01(1)(a).
17. Id. § 274.01(1)(a) (Supp. 1977).
18. Id.
19. Id. § 274.14 (1976). This time period may be extended by the commissioner of
revenue to July 31. Id.
20. The county board of equalization is usually composed of the county commissioners
and the county auditor. See id. § 274.13(1)(a) (Supp. 1977). The county board of equaliza-
tion may appoint a special board of equalization to perform its duties. Id. § 274.13(2)
(1976).
21. Id. § 273.13(1).
22. Id. §§ 270.11(1), .12(2).
23. The commissioner of revenue is the sole member of the state board of equalization.
Id. § 270.12.
24. Id. § 270.12(2).
25. See notes 235-51, 267-70 infra and accompanying text.
26. See MiNN. STAT. § 270.12(2) (1976).
27. See, e.g., id. § 275.09, as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 706, § 64, 1978 Minn.
Sess. Law Serv. 554 (West); Phipps, supra note 2, at 446.
28. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 272.03(8) (1976).
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ited market value refers to the restrictions placed by the legislature
upon increases in the value of property for tax purposes. Section
273.11(2) of Minnesota Statutes provides that the value of property for
tax purposes cannot be increased from year to year by more than certain
specified percentages." Thus, if the actual market value increases faster
than the permissible percentages under section 273.11(2), a valuation
for tax purposes of less than market value will result; this valuation is
referred to as "limited market value."" A final factor in determining
taxable value is the property's tax classification. The Minnesota Legis-
lature has determined that different types of real property should be
treated differently for assessment purposes." The result is that some
classes of property bear a greater share of the property tax burden than
others. For example, most commercial and industrial real estate is clas-
sified as class 4 property and is valued for tax purposes at forty-three
percent of limited market value. 2 In contrast, urban homestead prop-
erty is classified as class 3c property and has a taxable value of twenty-
two percent of limited market value.13 Consequently, to arrive at taxable
value the assessor determines first the market value of the property,
then whether the property has a limited market value under section
273.11(2), and finally the property's tax classification.
The levy is the decision by the governing bodies of the school district,
city, county, and state as to the total number of tax dollars each of those
governmental units intends to raise in the tax year in question. s1 The
tax liability of each parcel of real estate is then determined by the
county auditor,15 who computes the proportionate amount needed from
each parcel, based on its taxable value, to generate the tax dollars levied
by the various taxing authorities."
29. See notes 196-200 infra and accompanying text.
30. No specific statutory reference can be found to the term "limited market value,"
except in MINN. STAT. § 273.121 (1976), which refers to the market value of the property
as "limited by section 273.11 .... " The term "limited market value" has been adopted
by Minnesota assessors to describe the valuation as affected by section 273.11. See, e.g.,
MINNESOTA DEP'T OF REvENUE, 1976 REAL ESTATE AssEssMENT/SALms RATIO STUDY 1 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as 1976 AssssEMENT/SALEs RATIO STUDY].
31. See notes 189-200 infra and accompanying text.
32. See MINN. STAT. § 273.13(9) (1976).
33. Id. § 273.13(7) (Supp. 1977).
34. See, e.g., State ex rel. Minneapolis Fire Dep't Relief Ass'n v. City Council, 161
Minn. 103, 105, 200 N.W. 932, 933 (1924) ("As applied to the amount to be raised by
taxation, [the term levy] . ..means the formal and official action of a legislative body,
invested with the power of taxation-whether national, state, or local-whereby it deter-
mines and declares that a tax of a certain amount, or of a certain percentage of value,
shall be imposed on property subject thereto.") In Minnesota, the state, MINN. STAT. §
275.02 (1976), counties, id. § 275.03, cities, id. § 275.07 (Supp. 1977), towns, id., and school
districts, id., are authorized to levy property taxes.
35. See MINN. STAT. § 275.28 (1976).
36. See In re Summit House Apartment Co., - Minn .... 253 N.W.2d 127,
129 (1977) ("the auditor has the duty of calculating and assessing the taxes once the
taxable value has been determined by the assessor").
19781
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The process outlined above occurs between January 2 and December
31 of each year. By the end of the year the tax list, which specifies the
tax liability of each parcel of real estate,"7 is completed and given to the
county treasurer." He sends real property tax statements to the owners
of the taxable property within the county by January 31 of the following
year.3 The county treasurer also is responsible for collecting the prop-
erty taxes ' ° and distributing the proceeds to the various taxing authori-
ties."
Property taxes not paid by the first Monday in January after the year
in which they are payable are delinquent.'2 A list of delinquent proper-
ties within the county is filed with the clerk of district court on or before
February 15.11 Following published notice in a designated local newspa-
per, the district court acquires jurisdiction to enforce, against the delin-
quent parcels of real estate, all taxes, interest, and penalties resulting
from the delinquency." If no answer is made to the published notice, or
if no valid defense is raised at the delinquency hearing," judgment is
entered against the delinquent property."1 That property then is deemed
purchased by the state on the second Monday in May47 and the former
owner has five years from that date to redeem the property if it is
homesteaded, agricultural, or seasonal recreational property, and three
years if it is not." To redeem, the former owner must pay the county
treasurer all accrued taxes, penalties, and interest." If the property is
not redeemed and if the former owner has no valid grounds for attacking
the validity of the tax judgment, s the property tax cycle can be said to
have come to its completion.
37. See MINN. STAT. § 275.28 (1976).
38. See id. § 276,01 (Supp. 1977).
39. See id. § 276.04.
40. Id. § 276.02 (1976).
41. Id. § 276.10.
42. Id. § 279.02.
43. Id. § 279.05.
44. Id. § 279.14.
45. See notes 297-300 infra and accompanying text.
46. See MINN. STAT. H4 279.18-.19 (1976).
47. Id. § 280.001 (all tax-forfeited land for which a tax judgment has been rendered is
deemed bid in for the state by the county auditor); id. §§ 280.01-.02 (tax-judgment sale
in which land is bid in for the state occurs on the second Monday in May). The effect of
these provisions, although not entirely clear, is to eliminate the practice of selling tax-
forfeited land at tax-judgment sales to private purchasers. But see Note, The Minnesota
Tax Title: An Argument for Its Marketability- The 1874 Forfeiture System from a 1974
Perspective, 1 Wm. MTCHEaL L. Rzv. 1, 10 n.89 (1974) (author erroneously assumes that
MINN. STAT. § 280.01 did not eliminate the sale of tax-forfeited land to private purchasers
at tax-judgment sales).
48. MINN. STAT. § 281.17 (Supp. 1977).
49. See id. § 281.02 (1976).
50. See generally Note, supra note 47.
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Ill. GROUNDS FOR OBJECTING TO PROPERTY TAX AssEssMENTs
Numerous grounds have been urged as bases for reduction of property
tax assessments. The three most common grounds are discussed below:
overvaluation,5 unequal assessment," and illegality. 3
A. Overvaluation
The most frequent objection to property tax assessments is that the
property was valued in excess of market value. Section 272.03(8) of
Minnesota Statutes defines market value as "the usual selling price at
the place where the property to which the term is applied shall be at
the time of the assessment; being the price which could be obtained at
private sale and not at a forced or auction sale." In addition, section
273.12 requires that every assessor and board of review or equalization
"consider and give due weight to every element and factor affecting the
market value of the property being assessed." Thus, the touchstone of
the assessment process is market value.
At the outset, the distinction between a claim of overvaluation and a
claim of unequal assessment must be understood. A claim of overvalua-
tion involves an assertion by the taxpayer that his property was valued
at more than its market value." Historically, however, assessors, with-
out legislative approval, have valued property for tax purposes at
amounts less than market value.5 Although this trend has been reversed
significantly in recent years, it has resulted in most property still being
valued at less than market value." Consequently, a parcel of real estate
quite possibly could be overassessed in relation to other real estate in
the same taxing district, but nonetheless be assessed at less than market
value.57 In this situation an objection by a taxpayer must be based on a
claim of unequal assessment, for his property is not being valued at
more than market value. Despite this difference between a claim of
overvaluation and one of unequal assessment, the following discussion
is relevant to both; to make a-successful argument that his property was
unequally assessed, the taxpayer must still establish the market value
of the property. 58
51. See notes 54-95 infra and accompanying text.
52. See notes 96-200 infra and accompanying text.
53. See notes 201-10 infra and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Northerly Centre Corp. v. County of Ramsey, - Minn. -, 248
N.W.2d 923 (1976).
55. See notes 112-46 infra and accompanying text.
56. See 1976 AssEssmzNT/SALas RATo STUDY, supra note 30, at 159-82 (statistical analy-
sis).
57. See note 116 infra and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Renneke v. County of Brown, 255 Minn. 244, 248, 97 N.W.2d 377, 380
(1959) (to prove unequal assessment, taxpayer must establish market value of his property
and percentage applied by the assessor to that market value as compared to percentage
applied to other property in the same assessment district).
19781
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1. The "All Relevant Factors" Doctrine
In an action challenging an assessment as excessive, the assessor's
determination of market value is prima facie valid." The prima facie
validity of the assessment, however, is rebutted if the taxpayer estab-
lishes that the assessor failed to consider all relevant factors when the
market value determination was made.' The leading statement on the
relevant factors appears in In re Delinquent Real Estate Taxes, Waseca
County:"
Location, cost of construction, cost of reproduction, purpose for which
the building was used, the intrinsic value or worth of the building, the
price at which buyers who may use the property for some purpose are
willing to buy, the price at which similar property if any has sold and
many other things are all proper elements of consideration for the pur-
pose of determining the ultimate result, namely the sale value.
Waseca County has been supplemented by subsequent Minnesota Su-
preme Court decisions which have expanded the list of relevant factors
to include present and potential future use,"2 income produced by the
59. E.g., Minnesota Entertainment Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 306 Minn. 184, 186, 235
N.W.2d 390, 392 (1975); cf. MINN. STAT. § 272.06 (1976) (assessments of property for
purposes of taxation are presumed to be "legal").
60. See Schleiff v. County of Freeborn, 231 Minn. 389, 394-95, 43 N.W.2d 265, 268
(1950); cf. Xerox Corp. v. County of Hennepin, - Minn. -, -, 244 N.W.2d 135,
138 (1976) (assessor must consider all relevant factors in determining market value of
personal property for purposes of taxation).
61. 182 Minn. 543, 544-45, 235 N.W. 22, 22 (1931).
62. See, e.g., Minnesota Entertainment Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 306 Minn. 184, 187,
235 N.W.2d 390, 392 (1975). This factor brings into play the "highest and best use"
doctrine. Taxing authorities sometimes attempt to invoke this doctrine to justify an as-
sessment higher than what the taxpayer believes to be the property's market value. The
Minnesota Supreme Court has considered this issue in two recent cases. In Hedberg &
Sons v. County of Hennepin, 305 Minn. 80, 232 N.W.2d 743 (1975), the taxpayer owned
land that it used for gravel mining. The land was located in an area being rapidly devel-
oped for commercial uses, but the land was not zoned commercial. The future permissible
uses of the land were speculative because of the uncertainty of future zoning. The county
argued that the land should be valued at its highest and best use, which would have been
industrial, multifamily residential, office, or commercial. The court rejected this argu-
ment, holding that future zoning and highest and best use were relevant factors in deter-
mining market value, but only to the extent they have an impact on the present market
value of the property. Id. at 92, 232 N.W.2d at 750-51 (quoting State v. Pahl, 254 Minn.
349, 356, 95 N.W.2d 85, 90 (1959)).
Similarly, the taxpayer in Village of Burnsville v. Commissioner of Taxation, 295 Minn.
504, 202 N.W.2d 653 (1972) owned property that had a peculiar value to the taxpayer
because of its special business needs. The taxing authority argued that this justified an
assessment that would otherwise be excessive. The court disagreed and affirmed the tax
court's holding that the special value of the land to the taxpayer was relevant only to the
extent the special value increased the present market value and rendered the land more
attractive to potential purchasers. Id. at 508, 202 N.W.2d at 657. Thus, the court has made
clear that the potential highest and best use of property to the taxpayer are only probative
factors to the extent they affect the property's present market value.
[Vol. 4
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property, 3 access to the property," adjacent development,"5 and zoning
restrictions."6 The relevancy of each factor depends upon the facts of the
particular case, 7 and the decision of the trial court concerning the rele-
vant factors will be considered conclusive unless clearly erroneous."
The factors stated in Waseca County and other Minnesota cases pro-
vide some assistance in deciding whether the assessor correctly deter-
mined the property's market value. These cases, however, neither re-
quire that every factor be considered in each case nor specify the
weight to be given each factor.76 More helpful to an understanding of the
types of factors which must be considered by the assessor is the court's
discussion of the three most common methods of appraising the market
value of real estate: the comparable sales or market method, the cost of
replacement method, and the capitalization of income method.7'
The comparable sales or market method determines value by compar-
ison to sales of similar property.72 This method is the most accurate
measure of market value when many substantially similar properties are
63. See, e.g., Minnesota Entertainment Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 306 Minn. 184, 187,
235 N.W.2d 390, 392 (1975); Crossroads Center, Inc. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 286
Minn. 440, 444-48, 176 N.W.2d 530, 534-36 (1970); In re Taxes of Potlach Timber Co., 160
Minn. 209, 211-12, 199 N.W. 968, 969 (1924).
64. See Halla v. County of Hennepin, 306 Minn. 533, 534, 237 N.W.2d 348, 349 (1975);
Minnesota Entertainment Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 306 Minn. 184, 187, 235 N.W.2d 390,
392 (1975).
65. See, e.g., Minnesota Entertainment Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 306 Minn. 184, 187,
235 N.W.2d 390, 392 (1975); In re Taxes of Potlach Timber Co., 160 Minn. 209, 211, 199
N.W. 968, 969 (1924).
66. See Minnesota Entertainment Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 306 Minn. 184, 187, 235
N.W.2d 390, 392 (1975); Hedberg & Sons v. County of Hennepin, 305 Minn. 80, 92, 232
N.W.2d 743, 750-51 (1975).
67. See, e.g., Great Plains Supply Co. v. County of Goodhue, 268 Minn. 407, 409, 129
N.W.2d 335, 336 (1964).
68. See, e.g., Northerly Centre Corp. v. County of Ramsey, - Minn .... 248
N.W.2d 923, 926-27 (1976) (trial court's finding of fact on issue of valuation must be
affirmed unless clearly erroneous in the sense of being not reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole).
69. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., In re Delinquent Real Estate Taxes, Waseca County, 182 Minn. 543, 544-
45, 235 N.W. 22, 22 (1931). But see Minnesota Entertainment Enterprises, Inc. v. State,
306 Minn. 184, 188, 235 N.W.2d 390, 393 (1975) (recent sales price of property is one of
the most important elements of market value).
71. See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REAL EsTATE APPRAIsING (E. Friedman ed. 1959)
[hereinfter cited as ENCvCLOPmI]. Minnesota property tax assessment cases discussing
these three methods of appraisal include Northerly Centre Corp. v. County of Ramsey,
- Minn. - - 248 N.W.2d 923, 925-26 (1976) (cost of replacement, market, and
income methods invoked); Independent School Dist. No. 99 v. Commissioner of Taxation,
297 Minn. 378, 383-87, 211 N.W.2d 886, 889-91 (1973) (cost of replacement method); Al-
stores Realty, Inc. v. State, 286 Minn. 343, 176 N.W.2d 112 (1970) (cost of replacement,
market and income methods discussed); Crossroads Center, Inc. v. Commissioner of Taxa-
tion, 286 Minn. 440, 176 N.W.2d 530 (1970) (income and market methods).
72. E.g., Alstores Realty, Inc. v. State, 286 Minn. 343, 345, 176 N.W.2d 112, 114 (1970).
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sold at about the same time as the assessment." Consequently, it is the
primary method used in determining the market value of urban residen-
tial property." The major deficiency of the market approach is that no
two parcels of property are identical and therefore the assessor must
make adjustments when using the sales price of some property to deter-
mine the market value of other property. 5 Thus, a subjective element
is introduced into the appraisal process which can lead to valid disagree-
ment as to the property's value.
The cost of replacement method often is employed for "specialty"
property for which, generally, there are few comparable sales."6 Under
this approach, the value of the underlying land is first determined
through the market approach by comparison to the sales prices of com-
parable vacant lots." The value of the building then is determined by
calculating the cost of reconstructing the building, with appropriate
deductions made for depreciation.7" Proper calculation of the cost of
reconstruction under this approach often requires the services of a pro-
fessional engineer to determine the appropriate reproduction costs.79
The capitalization of income method can be a useful and often accur-
ate gauge of the market value of rental property." Although there are a
number of variations of this appraisal technique,81 they all attempt to
compute market value by capitalizing the net rental income of the prop-
erty at a reasonable rate of return."2 Basically, the net rental income is
73. See, e.g., Note, The Road to Uniformity in Real Estate Taxation: Valuation and
Appeal, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1418, 1431-32 (1976).
74. See, e.g., Santemma, Review of Real Estate Tax Assessments, 2 REAL ESTATE L.J.
685, 685 (1974); Note, supra note 73, at 1431.
75. See, e.g., Santemma & Murphy, Fair Market Value in Condemnation and Realty
Tax Proceedings, 6 REAL ESTATE L.J. 46, 51 (1977).
76. See generally Johnson, Cost Approach to Value, in ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 71, at
37.
77. See, e.g., Santemma, supra note 74, at 686; Santemma & Murphy, supra note 75,
at 52.
78. See, e.g., G. SCHMurrz, CONDEMNATION APPRAISAL HANDBOOK 51-58 (1963).
79. See Santemma, supra note 74, at 686-87.
80. See, e.g., Crossroads Center, Inc. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 286 Minn. 440, 445-
46, 176 N.W.2d 530, 534-35 (1970). See generally Hollebaugh, Income Approach to Value,
in ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 71, at 54. In Crossroads, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated
that, in using the income approach for property which was subject to a long-term lease,
the fair rental value should control over the existing rental rate under the long-term lease,
at least where the lease rate is less than fair rental value. See 286 Minn. at 447, 176 N.W.2d
at 535. This approach has been criticized on grounds that a long-term lease at less than
the fair rental value lowers the sales price, and hence the market value, of the property
subject to the lease; thus by assessing at fair rental value rather than actual rental value
the taxpayer is being assessed at more than actual market value. See Note, supra note
73, at 1435-36.
81. For a discussion of several variations of the capitalization of income method of
determining market value, see G. SCHMJtEr, supra note 78, at 47-48.
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first determined and then the market value is computed by using a
reasonable rate of return, which is applied to the net rental income to
calculate market value.u In essence, the market value is determined by
computing the present value of the future stream of income that the
property is likely to produce.
When discussing these appraisal methods the Minnesota Supreme
Court has emphasized that, generally, no single method can be utilized
to measure market value, for that would violate the statutory require-
ment that the assessor consider all relevant factors." The court has
stated that all three methods should be utilized where applicable," at
least to the extent of using them as checks on the accuracy of the pri-
mary method invoked."6 This requirement appears to be consistent with
good real estate appraisal practices, at least when valuing commercial
or industrial property." However, it is doubtful that the court would
require assessors to use all three methods when determining the market
value of most homesteads, for to do so would be administratively impos-
sible. Moreover, the comparable sales method alone normally will
produce sufficiently accurate results.u Thus, an understanding of all
three methods is most important in cases involving commercial or in-
dustrial property.
2. Expert Testimony
To establish market value, the taxpayer normally must present expert
appraisal testimony. The lack of an expert appraiser has been pointed
to by the court with disfavor on several occasions,89 while the use of a
good expert has proved to be pivotal in numerous cases."0 Consequently,
if the taxpayer cannot afford to hire an expert appraiser, the case proba-
bly is not worth litigating.
The need for expert testimony undoubtedly precludes many taxpayers
83. See, e.g., G. ScHmuwz, supra note 78, at 45-46.
84. See Crossroads Center, Inc. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 286 Minn. 440, 443-44,
176 N.W.2d 530, 533-34 (1970).
85. See Alstores Realty, Inc. v. State, 286 Minn. 343, 351-52, 176 N.W.2d 112, 117-18
(1970).
86. See Crossroads Center, Inc. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 286 Minn. 440, 444, 176
N.W.2d 530, 534 (1970) (court affirmed decision where income approach was used as a
check on market approach).
87. See Santemma, supra note 74, at 685-86; Note, supra note 73, at 1430.
88. See Santemma, supra note 74, at 685.
89. See State v. Fridley Recreation & Serv. Co., 288 Minn. 218, 221, 179 N.W.2d 172,
174 (1970) (court, holding against the taxpayer, noted that the taxpayer only submitted
vague, indirect, and inconclusive evidence of market value); Great Plains Supply Co. v.
County of Goodhue, 268 Minn. 407, 410-12, 129 N.W.2d 335, 337-38 (1964) (taxpayer relied
solely on evidence of recent sales price of property in question; court ruled for county,
emphasizing that valuation testimony was undisputed).
90. See, e.g., Alstores Realty, Inc. v. State, 286 Minn. 343, 346, 176 N.W.2d 112, 114
(1970) (court noted that taxpayer's appraisal witness was both qualified and experienced).
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from obtaining relief for excessive assessments. The Minnesota Legisla-
ture has attempted to remedy this problem by creating a special small
claims division of the Minnesota Tax Court, with informal procedures
and rules of evidence." Moreover, the legislature has encouraged the
department of revenue to prepare data to assist residential taxpayers in
proving excessive valuation 2 and has declared that this data is admissi-
ble without foundation in cases before the small claims division of the
tax court. Despite these reforms, the need for expert testimony in most
cases remains, and it is doubtful that much can be done to alleviate this
need because the determination of market value is a specialized art
which normally can be performed only by a qualified expert.
In summary, the valuation problem is a factual one and the basic
issue is the market value, or usual selling price, of the property. Al-
though many factors are relevant in determining market value, 4 the
fundamental objective is to convince the trial court, through the use of
expert witnesses, that the market value is something less than that
urged by the local taxing authorities."3
91. See notes 241-45 infra and accompanying text.
92. See MiNN. STAT. § 278.01(b) (Supp. 1977).
93. Id. § 271.21(6).
94. An interesting example of the diversity of factors that must be considered when
determining market value appears in an article from the Wall Street Journal:
The nation's Bicentennial has given rise to all sorts of patriotic celebrations,
some of them tacky and nonsensical but many of them ingenious and laudatory.
Still, one man's patriotism may be another man's burden, a fact of which we
were reminded by reading that county assessors recently reduced by almost
$14,000 the assessed valuation of a residence in the retirement community of
Sun City, Arizona.
The assessors did so after hearing complaints from the home owner that the
value of his property had been reduced because his next-door neighbor chose to
celebrate the Bicentennial by:
Painting a front yard palm tree red, white and blue and stringing flags from
it to the front of the home. Erecting 13 red, white and blue poles up to 18 feet
high and flying flags from some of them. Putting a 10-foot red, white and blue
tripod on the roof. Painting an 8-by-16 foot American flag on the roof. Erecting
a 70-foot tower in the backyard, from which fly 18 flags.
As if that were not enough, the neighbor reportedly painted his rooftop air
conditioner red, white and blue, and placed a large red, white and blue cattle
watering container in his front yard, equipping it with a fountain that splashes
water 20 feet in the air. Moreover, he illuminated the entire display with lights
and installed outdoor loudspeakers to blare musical accompaniment.
Patriotism and Property Values, Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1976, at 20, cols. 1 & 2.
95. The success of taxpayers in attacking property tax assessments has not been insub-
stantial. A judge of the Minnesota Tax Court has estimated that the court grants relief
to the taxpayers in approximately 40% of the cases presented to it. Address by the Honor-
able Earl Gustafson, Judge of the Minnesota Tax Court, given to the Hennepin
County Bar Association, Local Government Section (Dec. 13, 1977). Indeed, in close cases
trial courts have been known to compromise, basically splitting the difference between the
opposing valuations, and have been affirmed on appeal. See Northerly Centre Corp. v.
County of Ramsey, - Minn. -, -, 248 N.W.2d 923, 927 (1976) (supreme court
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B. Unequal Assessments
Inequality of assessments can stem from one of two basic sources:
first, from practices by local assessors that are not authorized by statute
and that result in similarly situated property taxpayers receiving differ-
ent treatment, and second, from specific legislative classifications that
require certain classes of property to be treated differently from others
for assessment purposes. Whether these sources of inequality are unlaw-
ful depends primarily upon the application of the equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution, the uniformity clause of the
Minnesota Constitution, and to some extent upon enactments by the
Minnesota Legislature. The following sections will discuss separately
these two basic sources of inequality. With regard to unauthorized prac-
tices by local assessors, certain general constitutional principles will
first be discussed," then specific recurring problems will be analyzed.
These specific problems concern the assessment of property in the same
class at varying percentages of market value, 7 discrimination through
inconsistent use of certain formulas or factors when determining market
value," and disparate assessment practices among taxing districts."
1. Inequality Resulting From Unauthorized Practices By Local
Assessors
a. General Constitutional Principles
The United States Supreme Court on a number of occasions has ana-
lyzed the role of the equal protection clause in cases involving the une-
qual assessment of property for state property tax purposes. The Court
has been consistent in holding that inequality resulting from mere errors
by local assessors does not rise to the level of a violation of the equal
protection clause.'" Rather, to violate equal protection the discrimina-
tion must be intentional or "purposeful,"'' and not merely the result of
a mistake by an assessor."02 The apparent justification for this require-
recognized that district court in effect had reached a compromise but held that the
compromise was justified and probably required by the conflicting expert testimony);
Halla v. County of Hennepin, 306 Minn. 533, 534, 237 N.W.2d 348, 349-50 (1975) (supreme
court affirmed, holding that compromise reached because of conflicting evidence was not
unreasonable or clearly erroneous).
96. See notes 100-11 infra and accompanying text.
97. See notes 112-63 infra and accompanying text.
98. See notes 164-69 infra and accompanying text.
99. See notes 170-88 infra and accompanying text.
100. See Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 623 (1946); Snowden v.
Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1944) (dictum); Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board of Revision of
Tax Assessments, 284 U.S. 23, 28-29 (1931); Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260
U.S. 441, 445 (1923); Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350 (1918).
101. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 9 (1944) (dictum).
102. Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 353 (1918) ("It is
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ment of intent to discriminate is federal-state comity; if taxpayers could
obtain federal court relief for mistakes in judgment by assessors the
federal courts could be placed in the position of tax review boards, thus
disrupting the state property tax system. 03 This concern for federal-
state comity in the property tax area also has caused Congress to enact
legislation that requires taxpayers who allege discriminatory assess-
ments to exhaust all reasonable state remedies before they can obtain
federal court relief."' Consequently, unintentional but unequal assess-
ments must be remedied under state law in the state courts, and to
obtain federal relief systematic or intentional discrimination must be
proved and state remedies exhausted.
In addition to the federal equal protection clause, unequal assess-
ments also can be attacked under the state uniformity clause, which
requires that taxes be uniform. 10 Unlike many other state courts,", the
Minnesota Supreme Court has applied the same standards to the uni-
formity clause of the state constitution as the United States Supreme
Court does to the federal equal protection clause.' 7 Thus, the Minnesota
court has stated that the requirement of uniformity is violated if the
taxpayer is assessed in a manner substantially unequal to other taxpay-
ers of the same class. 08 Moreover, the court has clarified that mere errors
of judgment in estimating market value do not create a constitutional
violation and that something approaching intentional discrimination is
required. 9 The court has noted, however, that good faith on the part of
assessors does not justify an assessment that is "discriminatory in
fact.""' 0 The court presumably meant by this statement that intent
refers to the absence of a mistake in the valuation. Thus, substantially
unequal treatment which is not the result of mistake violates the Minne-
sota Constitution, even if done in good faith."'
Although the principles enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court and followed by the Minnesota Supreme Court appear to be quite
straightforward, an analysis of their application in various distinct fac-
103. Southland Mall, Inc. v. Garner, 455 F.2d 887, 889 (6th Cir. 1972).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970); see Clement, Discrimination in Real Property Tax Assess-
ment: A Litigation Strategy for Pennsylvania, 36 U. Prrr. L. REv. 285, 286 (1974).
105. MINN. CONST. art. X, § 1 ("Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of sub-
jects .. ").
106. See notes 124-25 infra and accompanying text.
107. See Elwell v. County of Hennepin, 301 Minn. 63, 75-76, 221 N.W.2d 538, 546-47
(1974); In re Taxes on Property of Cold Spring Granite Co., 271 Minn. 460, 466, 136
N.W.2d 782, 787 (1965).
108. See, e.g., Hamm v. State, 255 Minn. 64, 70-71, 95 N.W.2d 649, 654-55 (1959).
109. Id. at 70, 95 N.W.2d at 655.
110. Id. at 71, 95 N.W.2d at 655.
111. The court in Hamm cited the Arizona case of McCluskey v. Sparks, 80 Ariz. 15,
291 P.2d 791 (1955), in which the Arizona Supreme Court stated that systematic and
intentional discrimination in assessment practices is unlawful even if the assessors be-
lieved their conduct was valid. Id. at 20, 291 P.2d at 794.
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tual settings indicates the simplicity of those principles often is decep-
tive.
b. Property in the Same Class Assessed at Varying Percentages of
Market Value
A relatively frequent source of litigation, both in Minnesota", and
elsewhere," 3 involves the situation where the taxpayer's property is as-
sessed at a higher rate than most others of the same class. This problem
has arisen because of the widespread and unauthorized practice by as-
sessors, at least in the past, of valuing property at less than actual
market value,"' sometimes referred to as fractional value assessment."5
Thus, it is possible for some property in a taxing district to be valued
at less than market value, for example at eighty percent of market value,
yet be assessed at a higher rate than most other property in that district,
which for example might be assessed at sixty percent of market value.",
As a consequence, the property assessed at a higher rate would bear
more than its share of the property tax burden. This problem has been
addressed both by the Minnesota Legislature and by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in recent years. The supreme court has been concerned
primarily with determining what remedy should be given the taxpayer
who is treated unequally,"' while the legislature's efforts in this area
112. See, e.g., Dulton Realty, Inc. v. State, 270 Minn. 1, 132 N.W.2d 394 (1964); Wagner
v. Commissioner of Taxation, 258 Minn. 330, 104 N.W.2d 26 (1960); Renneke v. County
of Brown, 255 Minn. 244, 97 N.W.2d 377 (1959); Hamm v. State, 255 Minn. 64, 95 N.W.2d
649 (1959).
113. See, e.g., E. Ingraham Co. v. Town & City of Bristol, 144 Conn. 374, 132 A.2d 563
(1957); Switz v. Township of Middletown, 23 N.J. 580, 130 A.2d 15 (1957).
114. See, e.g., Dulton Realty, Inc. v. State, 270 Minn. 1, 132 N.W.2d 394 (1964). The
Dulton court made the following observation:
From the foregoing it can be ascertained that the solution of the problem
before us is difficult, not only because our statutory scheme of assessment is
antiquated and inadequate, but also because its basic requirements have to a
great extent been ignored. Instead of using the market or true and full value of
property to be assessed as the basis for its taxation, as the statutes require, each
assessor has established a formula under which only a percentage of such value
is used for assessment purposes. These percentages vary greatly from one taxing
district to another even within counties.
Id. at 20, 132 N.W.2d at 407-08.
115. See, e.g., Note, supra note 73, at 1422.
116. The court in Dulton Realty, Inc. v. State, 270 Minn. 1, 132 N.W.2d 394 (1964)
stated:
In the case before us, percentage variations prevailed not only between taxing
districts within St. Louis County, but also as to various properties and types of
properties within the city of Duluth. There for tax purposes assessors arbitrarily
based their appraisals on percentages of market value ranging between 30 per-
cent and 90.3875 percent thereof, a procedure for which there is no statutory
authority whatever.
Id. at 20-21, 132 N.W.2d at 408.
117. See notes 119-46 infra and accompanying text.
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have concentrated on abolishing the practice of fractional value assess-
ment."'8
i. Minnesota Supreme Court Decisions
For many years the Minnesota Supreme Court took the position that
a taxpayer had no standing to complain if his property was not assessed
in excess of market value."' Following the mandate of the United States
Supreme Court,'10 however, the Minnesota court in the 1959 decision of
Hamm v. State2 ' reversed its prior position. Hamm and its progeny
have established that where a taxpayer's property is intentionally and
arbitrarily assessed at a rate substantially higher than most other prop-
erty in the same taxing district, even though less than market value, the
taxpayer has a constitutional right to have the assessed value reduced.'2
The court in Hamm held that proof of intent to discriminate was
required both under the uniformity clause of the Minnesota Constitu-
tion and the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution.' 3 This
interpretation of the state uniformity clause differs from the interpreta-
tion given by many other state courts to the uniformity clauses of their
respective state constitutions in cases where the taxpayer's property is
assessed at less than market value, but at a greater rate than most other
property."' These other state courts require only a showing of lack of
reasonably uniform treatment in assessment practices, without the re-
quirement of intent to discriminate. 12
The state courts not requiring intent to discriminate in this situation
appear to be on sound footing. The primary reason the federal courts
require intent to discriminate in property tax assessment cases brought
under the equal protection clause is federal-state comity.'26 This concern
is not present when a state court interprets a state constitutional provi-
sion requiring uniformity in property tax assessment practices. Conse-
quently, reliance by the Hamm court upon federal equal protection
cases requiring intent seems misplaced.
118. See notes 147-63 infra and accompanying text.
119. See State v. Cudahy Packing Co., 103 Minn. 419, 425-27, 115 N.W. 1039, 1039-40
(1908) (on rehearing).
120. See Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1923).
121. 255 Minn. 64, 95 N.W.2d 649 (1959).
122. See cases cited in note 112 supra.
123. 255 Minn. at 70, 95 N.W.2d at 655.
124. See, e.g., McKnight Shopping Center, Inc. v. Board of Property Assessment, App.
& Rev., 417 Pa. 234, 240-42, 209 A.2d 389, 392-93 (1965); Note, supra note 73, at 1421-22.
But see McCluskey v. Sparks, 80 Ariz. 15, 19-20, 291 P.2d 791, 793-94 (1955) (systematic
and intentional discrimination must be proved under uniformity clause of Arizona Consti-
tution).
125. See, e.g., Robinson v. State Tax Comm'n, 216 Or. 532, 536-37, 339 P.2d 432, 434-
35 (1959) (assessments that are not relatively uniform with other assessments violate the
state uniformity clause).
126. See notes 103-04 supra and accompanying text.
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The intent requirement also contradicts the Minnesota cases provid-
ing relief when an assessment is greater than the property's market
value. Under these cases, intent need not be established; the taxpayer
only must prove that the valuation given his property exceeded the
property's actual market value.'27 The obvious reason for not requiring
intent to discriminate in these cases is that a taxpayer should not be
required to bear more than his share of the tax burden, whether the
result of inadvertent or intentional overvaluation. This reasoning should
also apply where the taxpayer's property is assessed at less than market
value but at a greater percentage of market value than other property
of the same class in the same taxing district. Consequently, as most
other courts hold, unequal treatment resulting in the taxpayer paying
more than his share of property taxes should be sufficient grounds,
without proof of intent to discriminate, for relief under the state uni-
formity clause.
Although the Minnesota unequal assessment cases since Hamm have
reaffirmed the intent requirement,' 2 the Minnesota Supreme Court has
not strictly enforced that requirement. For example, the court in
Renneke v. County of Brown, '2 after discussing Hamm, ruled that the
trial court must make two essential findings of fact in unequal assess-
ment cases: (1) the actual market value of the property in question at
the time of the assessment and (2) the percentage applied by the asses-
sor to the market value of the property as compared with the percentage
applied to other property of the same class in the same assessment
district.1a0 Thus, the Renneke court did not require that trial courts
make a specific finding of intent to discriminate. Other Minnesota cases
also indicate Hamm was not designed to restrict severely the right of
aggrieved taxpayers to obtain state court relief. 3' Thus, the Hamm
court may have simply followed federal equal protection law without
considering whether different standards might be appropriate under the
uniformity clause of the Minnesota Constitution.'32 Nonetheless, the
intent requirement does linger as a threat to taxpayers with otherwise
meritorious claims.
A second problem raised by Hamm and subsequent Minnesota cases
is the amount of reduction in valuation that should be received by
taxpayers whose property has been assessed at a greater percentage of
127. See notes 54-95 supra and accompanying text.
128. For a listing of some of those cases, see note 112 supra.
129. 255 Minn. 244, 97 N.W.2d 377 (1959).
130. Id. at 248, 97 N.W.2d at 380.
131. See, e.g., Dulton Realty, Inc. v. State, 270 Minn. 1,132 N.W.2d 394 (1964) (apply-
ing Hamm to provide relief from unequal assessments).
132. The court in Hamm discussed the United States Supreme Court cases on point in
some detail, but did not discuss cases from other jurisdictions construing the uniformity
clauses of their respective state constitutions. See 255 Minn. at 69-71, 95 N.W.2d at 654-
55.
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market value than most other property. Once again the Hamm court
ruled differently from courts in most other jurisdictions, but on this
issue the court was more liberal than most others. The majority of courts
permit a reduction in valuation to the average percent of market value
applied to all property of the same class in the assessment district. "3
Consequently, if the objecting taxpayer's property is assessed at fifty
percent of market value and the average for all property of the same
class in the taxing district is fifty percent of market value, in most states
the taxpayer is denied relief, even if some taxpayers are assessed at less
than fifty percent. This was also the rule in Minnesota prior to Hamm.'3,
In Hamm the taxpayer's property was assessed at the average per-
centage of market value in the assessment district;'1 thus most courts
would have denied him relief. The Hamm court, however, held that the
taxpayer had a right to have his assessment reduced to the lowest rate
applied to property of the same class within the same assessment dis-
trict."' The effect of this standard is illustrated by another leading
Minnesota decision, Dulton Realty, Inc. v. State.'37 In Dulton, the city
assessor applied varying ratios ranging from sixty-nine percent to ninety
percent of actual market value to determine the market value of the
plaintiffs' commercial property for property tax purposes.,, Most other
commercial real estate in the city, however, was valued at about forty
percent of market value, with some commercial property assessed as low
as thirty percent. 13 The court held that the plaintiffs' property must be
assessed at thirty percent of market value, the lowest ratio applied to
other commercial property in the city."10 In effect, therefore, the Hamm
rule allows taxpayers who can overcome the burden of proving inten-
tional or systematic discrimination to receive the windfall of having
their property assessed at a lower rate than most other property in the
same assessment district.
The Hamm rule concerning reduction in the amount of assessment
133. See, e.g., Campbell Chain Co. v. County of Alameda, 12 Cal. App. 3d 248, 253-58,
90 Cal. Rptr. 501, 504-08 (1970); Brooks Bldg. Tax Assessment Case, 391 Pa. 94, 100-01,
137 A.2d 273, 276 (1958) (quoting Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board of Revision of Tax
Assessment, 284 U.S. 23, 29 (1931)). See generally Cheng, The Common Level of Assess-
ment in Property Taxation, 23 NAT'L TAx J. 50 (1970).
134. See State v. Thayer, 69 Minn. 170, 71 N.W. 931 (1897).
135. 255 Minn. at 67, 95 N.W.2d at 653.
136. Id. at 67.68, 95 N.W.2d at 653. The holding in Hamm on this point is not entirely
clear, but the court did make clear that an assessment based on the average percentages
of market value in the taxing district was constitutionally infirm if that average percent-
age was not consistently followed. Id. In Dulton Realty, Inc. v. State, 270 Minn. 1, 132
N.W.2d 394 (1964), the court interpreted Hamm as requiring a reduction to "the lowest
percentage" of market value applied to other property within the taxing district. Id. at
21, 132 N.W.2d at 408.
137. 270 Minn. 1, 132 N.W.2d 394 (1964).
138. Id. at 5, 132 N.W.2d at 398.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 21, 132 N.W.2d at 408.
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has been criticized as promoting inequality, threatening the financial re-
sources of local governmental units, providing an unwarranted windfall
to litigious taxpayers, and going beyond what is necessary under the
federal and state constitutions."' Each of these criticisms undoubtedly
has merit. Hamm can be viewed differently, however. The case was
decided at a time when arbitrary and unauthorized classifications by
assessors were widespread in this country."' Assessors, without the sanc-
tion of the legislature, often would make policy decisions as to what class
or particular parcels of property should carry a greater share of the tax
burden than others and would apply varying percentages of market
value accordingly."' Hamm appears to have been designed to attack this
practice rather than the less reprehensible situation where the property
of a single taxpayer is inadvertently assessed at a higher percentage of
market value than most other property."' If this explanation of Hamm
is accepted, the court's decision to reduce the assessment to the lowest
percentage applied within the assessment district is more understand-
able; it serves as a strong incentive for assessors to eliminate arbitrary
and unauthorized practices as well as significant punishment for those
who do not. "5 Moreover, under this interpretation of Hamm the require-
ment of showing intentional or systematic discrimination is less harsh,
for the types of assessment practices involved almost invariably are
intentional or systematic. Hamm therefore can be viewed as an effective
judicial effort to eliminate arbitrary and discriminatory assessment
practices.
141. See Note, Inequality in Property Tax Assessments: New Cure for an Old I1, 75
HARv. L. REv. 1374, 1391-92 (1962).
142. See, e.g., E. Ingraham Co. v. Town & City of Bristol, 144 Conn. 374, 132 A.2d 563
(1957); Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 343 Mass. 223, 178 N.E.2d 10 (1961); In re
Kents 2124 Atlantic Ave., Inc., 34 N.J. 21, 166 A.2d 763 (1961). The Kents case provides
a good example of the extent of discrimination that existed in some localities. In one city,
valuation of residential property varied from 4.13% to 86% of market value, vacant land
from 2.25% to 88% of market value, and other property from 5.13% to 79.38% of market
value. 34 N.J. at 27, 166 A.2d at 766.
143. See Lesnick, Does Full Value Mean Full Value? Prospects for Assessment Reform
in New York in Light of the Experience of Other States with Hellerstein's Progenitors, 5
HoFsTsA L. REv. 235 (1977). The author states:
(FIractional assessment in large part reflected policy decisions by assessors
and, to a lesser extent, by reviewing courts, responding to a variety of social and
economic needs. These have included the need to maintain municipal fiscal
integrity in periods of depression and to restrain municipal spending during
periods of inflation, the desire to subsidize unprofitable industries important to
the local economy and, in some cases, an attempt to make the tax less regres-
sive.
Id. at 237-38.
144. See 255 Minn. at 70, 95 N.W.2d at 654-55 (1959) (court emphasizes that arbitrary
practices by assessors of assessing property at different percentages of market value are
illegal).
145. See The Minnesota Supreme Court, 1964-65, supra note 1, at 555.
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The Hamm approach may be an effective way to combat arbitrary
and intentional discriminatory assessment practices, but it does little
to resolve the problems of a taxpayer whose property is inadvertently
assessed at a proportionately higher rate than most others, yet at less
than market value. Such a taxpayer still must bear a disproportionate
share of the property tax burden under Hamm. The soundest solution
might be to combine the best aspects of both Hamm and the majority
approach. When a taxpayer establishes widespread"6 arbitrary, inten-
tional assessment practices he should be permitted a reduction of mar-
ket value to the lowest rate applied by the assessors in the assessment
district, thus providing an incentive to stop such practices. However,
where the taxpayer is subjected to unequal treatment because of unin-
tentional error by assessors, the taxpayer should be permitted a reduc-
tion in valuation only to the average rate for the assessment district.
ii. Legislative Action
The Minnesota Legislature has long required that property be as-
sessed at market value,"7 but that requirement went unheeded by local
assessors who, as discussed above, designed their own schemes for as-
146. The court has been more reluctant to grant relief where most taxpayers are as-
sessed at a uniform, higher rate than a few select taxpayers of the same class who are given
unjustified special treatment. As Mr. Justice Mitchell once noted, if one of the many
taxpayers assessed at the higher rate was permitted a reduction to the lower, preferential
rate, equality would not be achieved but rather the inequality would be magnified. State
v. Lakeside Land Co., 71 Minn. 283, 287, 73 N.W. 970, 971 (1898). Moreover, if a substan-
tial number of the taxpayers assessed at the higher rate were granted a reduction to the
preferential rate, the local government revenues could be seriously affected. Id. Appar-
ently for these reasons, the court has required a showing that the discriminatory assess-
ment practices involve more than just a few parcels. See Ploetz v. County of Hennepin,
301 Minn. 410, 414, 223 N.W.2d 761, 764 (1974) ("While we do not believe that it was
necessary to compare the subject property with a substantial number of other properties
in order to prove assessment discrimination, we deem it inadvisable to base such a finding
upon the few parcels about which testimony was offered in this case."). This requirement
is not necessarily inconsistent with Hamm, for the court in Hamm stated: "Uniformity
of taxation does not permit the systematic, arbitrary, or intentional valuation of the
property of one or a few taxpayers at a substantially higher valuation than that placed
on other property of the same class." 255 Minn. at 70, 95 N.W.2d at 654.
A possible solution to this problem might be to grant all petitioning taxpayers a reduc-
tion to the lower, preferential rate if the preference was intentional, but to give the
government the option of reassessing the property granted preferential treatment, which
could be done pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 270.16 (1976). This solution would guarantee
equality, either by lowering the assessment rate of most taxpayers or by raising the rate
for the few preferred taxpayers, yet would give the taxing authority an option that would
protect its treasury. This solution would be constitutional, however, only if the burden
was on the state to raise the rate for the preferred taxpayers. See Township of Hillsborough
v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 623 (1946). Consequently, if the local taxing authority is
informed of the preferential treatment given to some taxpayers but refuses to remedy the
inequality, then the nonpreferred taxpayer should be allowed by the court to have his
property valuation reduced.
147. See, e.g., State v. Thayer, 69 Minn. 170, 71 N.W. 931 (1897).
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sessing property at varying percentages of market value. Probably due
in large part to the attention drawn to this problem by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Hamm and later cases, the Minnesota Legislature has
taken steps in recent years to supplement the standards established in
those cases.
The primary concern of the legislature has been to make certain that
all property is valued by local assessors at full market value. In 1967,
the legislature amended Minnesota Statutes, section 273.11, to make
clear that property must be assessed initially at its actual market
value.' However, the legislature also legalized the practice of assessing
at less than market value, but only if actual market value first was
determined, a uniform percentage rate was applied to all property
within the assessment district, and that rate was reported annually to
the state commissioner of revenue."' As a result, uniformity in the val-
uation of real estate for property tax purposes was required, although
not at market value.
In 1971, section 273.11 was further amended to eliminate the practice
of assessing at less than market value.'O The statute now provides that
"[aill property . . .shall be valued at the market value of such prop-
erty and not at . . . some lesser value than its market value."'' Thus,
the legislature clearly intended to eliminate the practice of fractional
value assessments. This change in theory should have no effect on the
amount of tax each property owner must pay.'52 For example, the tax
burden of each taxpayer will not vary if all property is valued for tax
purposes either at one-third of market value or at full market value.
Equality is achieved if all property is assessed uniformly, even if at less
than market value.'" The 1971 amendment eliminating fractional as-
sessments is significant, however, because it provides the taxpayer with
more effective notice of unequal treatment; inequality should be more
readily identified when the taxpayer's property is supposed to be as-
sessed at full market value rather than a fraction of market value."'
The Minnesota Legislature took further steps to achieve equality in
1977, when it enacted section 278.01(b).115 This section provides that
where a homeowner's property is assessed at more than a ten-percent
148. See Tax Reform and Relief Act of 1967, ch. 32, art. 7, § 3, 1967 Minn. Laws 2161
(amended 1971) (codified at MINN. STAT. § 273.11).
149. Id. at 2162.
150. Act of May 21, 1971, ch. 427, § 1, 1971 Minn. Laws 736 (codified at MINN. STAT. §
273.11).
151. MINN. STAT. § 273.11(1) (1976).
152. See Aaron, Some Observations on Property Tax Valuation and the Significance of
Full Value Assessment, in THE PROPERTY TAx AND ITS ADMNISTRAToN 156-57 (A. Lynn ed.
1969).
153. See, e.g., State v. Thayer, 69 Minn. 170, 174-75, 71 N.W. 931, 932-33 (1897).
154. See Aaron, supra note 152, at 157-58.
155. Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 423, art. 4, § 8, 1977 Minn. Laws 1045 (amended 1978)
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 278.01(b)).
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variance from the "average assessment/sales ratio" for homesteaded
property in the same area of the county, as determined by the commis-
sioner of revenue, the taxpayer can have the validity of the assessment
determined in district court or tax court.1 5 The average assess-
ment/sales ratio is a ratio that compares the sales prices of recently sold
homesteaded properties with the value given those properties for tax
purposes." 7 The ratio is designed to measure how close to market value
the assessors are valuing property and the extent of inequality in assess-
ment practices.5 For example, if the average assessment/sales ratio for
a certain area is .80, this means that the homesteaded property in
that area is on the average assessed at eighty percent of market value
and therefore is not in compliance with the legislative mandate that
property be assessed at full market value. Under section 278.01 a home-
owner must compare the market value of his homestead with the as-
sessed value, and if that ratio exceeds by ten percent the average assess-
ment/sales ratio for homesteaded property in his area he presumably is
entitled to relief.
Section 278.01(b) seems to be designed to provide homeowners with
a means of correcting unequal treatment, with definite standards and
minimal proof problems.'"' Whether the legislation achieves this result,
however, is uncertain. The statute is not clear as to what the taxpayer's
remedy is if his property is assessed at a greater than ten-percent vari-
ance from the applicable average assessment/sales ratio. It merely pro-
vides the right to "have the validity of his claim" determined. However,
the taxpayer had the right to bring an inequality claim in district court
prior to the enactment of section 278.01(b).' 6' Therefore, the statute
probably was intended to effect some change from the prior law.'" The
statute apparently is designed to provide homeowners relief whenever
they can establish that their property was assessed at greater than a ten-
156. See MINN. STAT. § 278.01 (Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch.
672, § 9, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 426 (West).
157. See generally 1976 AssEssM~Er/SALEs RATIO STUDY, supra note 30; 2 BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1972 CENSUS OF Gov'Ts, TAXABLE PROPERTY VALUES AND
AssassMENT-SALEs PRICE RATIOS pt. 2 (1973).
158. See 1976 ASSSMFNT/SALEs RATIO STUDY, supra note 30, at 1.
159. The Minnesota act appears to have been designed after the provision of the model
act prepared by the federal Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, but the
provisions of the model act are explicit that a 10% variance from the relevant assess-
ment/sales ratio establishes that the assessment was incorrect. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, NEW PROPOSALS FOR 1971 STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAMS
app. § 15-41-40, at 6 (Nov. 1970) (Assessment Notification, Review and Appeal Procedure
Act § 9(b)) (document M-53) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY COMM'N].
160. Prior to the addition of subdivision b in 1977, section 278.01 permitted an action
for allegedly unequal assessments. This prior provision was not altered by the 1977 amend-
ment, but rather is still located in section 278.01(a).
161. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 645.17(2) (1976) (In determining the intent of the legisla-
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percent variance from the average assessment/sales ratio.' Thus, the
statute should be amended to make clear that when the taxpayer has
met this burden he has a right to have his assessment reduced to the
average assessment/sales ratio level. If the statute is not so amended,
the courts should interpret it to provide homeowners such a right, since
this is the apparent intent of the section.
The recent enactments of the Minnesota Legislature, as outlined
above, have not altered the standards and principles established in
Hamm and its progeny, except that where section 278.01(b) applies a
homeowner may be able to obtain relief from an unequal assessment
without proving intent to discriminate. Rather, the actions of the su-
preme court and legislature can be viewed as complementary; the su-
preme court has concentrated on the relief available to taxpayers who
have suffered from discriminatory assessments, while the legislature has
concentrated primarily upon eliminating discriminatory assessment
practices, particularly in requiring full-value assessments. The extent to
which the efforts of the court and legislature have succeeded in eliminat-
ing unequal assessments is not yet clear, " but if the statutory mandates
are enforced vigorously by both the courts and the commissioner of
revenue, and if the legislative and judicial changes suggested above are
made, many of the problems and inequities in this area can be eradi-
cated.
c. Inequality Resulting From Inconsistent Use of Formulas or Factors
By Assessors When Determining Market Value
As was explained in the earlier section concerning overvaluation, an
assessor must consider many factors and methods of valuation when
computing the market value of property. 6' If the factors or methods of
valuation are utilized by the assessor in an inconsistent manner, thus
resulting in unjustified differences in valuation for tax purposes, ag-
grieved taxpayers may argue that their equal protection rights have
been violated. The Hamm court addressed this problem in dicta, when
it stated that the equal protection and uniformity clauses do not
"permit the adoption of an arbitrary yardstick of valuation which ig-
nores their differences in actual market value.' 6 5 In general, the resolu-
tion of this problem turns on whether the different manner of assess-
ment resulted from bona fide differences in the properties involved. A
162. See note 159 supra.
163. Statistics compiled by the Minnesota Department of Revenue indicate that valua-
tions presently vary from 50% to 140% of actual market value. 1976 ASSESSMENT/SALES
RATIo STuDY, supra note 30, at 1. Moreover, a comparison of statistics from 1956 through
1976 indicates evidence of improvement in uniformity of assessments over that period is
inconclusive. See id. at 223.
164. See notes 59-88 supra and accompanying text.
165. 255 Minn. at 70, 95 N.W.2d at 654.
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good illustration of this principle is provided by Wagner v. Commis-
sioner of Taxation."'
In Wagner, the property in question was a 133-acre family farm bor-
dering Lake Bemidji. The property always had been assessed on an
acreage-use basis, as was normal for farm land. In 1952, however, the
taxing district assessed the property on a front-foot basis, as if it were
residential property. The surrounding farms, not bordering Lake Be-
midji, continued to be assessed on the acreage-use basis. The change in
the method of valuation resulted in an increase in valuation of the
taxpayer's property from $1,730 to $13,646. The taxpayer claimed she
was unlawfully discriminated against because her property was assessed
on the front-foot basis. The supreme court rejected the taxpayer's argu-
ment, reasoning that the different manner of assessment was justified
because the property's location bordering Lake Bemidji had made it
attractive for residential use.' 7 The court stated that even though the
property was used as farm land it was in demand as residential property,
which justified it being assessed as residential property.' 8 The lesson to
be learned from Wagner, therefore, is that many factors must be consid-
ered in determining market value, and so long as the different method
of assessment used has a rational relationship to the determination of
actual market value, equal protection is not violated. If, however, the
different manner of assessment bears no rational relation to differences
in market value, then the taxpayer's equal protection rights probably
have been violated.'69
d. Disparities Among Taxing Districts
Another difficult problem arises where all taxpayers in the same class
are treated equally within the same taxing district, but unequally in
relation to taxpayers in other districts. The Minnesota Supreme Court
has recognized that, ideally, equality in property taxation should be
statewide, 7 ' but as yet it has been reluctant to require statewide or even
countywide equality because of the practical problems involved'", and
166. 258 Minn. 330, 104 N.W.2d 26 (1960).
167. Id. at 333, 104 N.W.2d at 28.
168. Id. at 333-34, 104 N.W.2d at 28-29. Two justices dissented, arguing that "the
present use to which the land is being put should be controlling in determining valuation
where that use is consistent with the use to which the majority of adjoining property is
being devoted." Id. at 335, 104 N.W.2d at 29. Wagner illustrates well a problem that many
farmers near growing urban areas face-increased valuation of their farms, and thus
increased taxation, because of urban growth. The legislature has responded to this prob-
lem by enacting the "green acres" law, which requires assessors to value farm land accord-
ing to the land's value as a farm, regardless of its potential highest and best use as
residential property. See MINN. STAT. § 273.11 (Supp. 1977).
169. The taxpayer probably also must prove substantial inequality and intent to dis-
criminate. See notes 108-09 supra and accompanying text.
170. See Dulton Realty, Inc. v. State, 270 Minn. 1, 17, 132 N.W.2d 394, 406 (1964).
171. See Johnson v. County of Ramsey, 290 Minn. 307, 314, 187 N.W.2d 675, 679 (1971)
[Vol. 4
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol4/iss2/4
REAL PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENTS
the potential effect on state and local government finances. 7 ' The court
has limited itself to requiring substantial equality only among taxpayers
within the same taxing district, while urging the legislature to take steps
to ensure statewide equality."' For example, in the leading case of
Dulton Realty, Inc. v. State' the court condemned the practice of as-
sessing property within the same taxing district at different rates, yet
reluctantly refused to extend its ruling to the county as a whole. 75 Simi-
larly, in Bethke v. County of Brown7 ' the court struck down the practice
of reassessing only a portion of a taxing district, holding that all prop-
erty within a district must be placed upon the tax rolls at the new
valuations at the same time. "7 Yet in Johnson v. County of Ramsey'
the court held that some taxing districts within a county could be reas-
sessed in a given year even if others within the same county were not.'7
Consequently, Minnesota case law to date does nothing to ensure state-
wide, or even countywide, equality in assessment practices.
The legislature has taken steps to eliminate unequal treatment among
taxing districts. As discussed earlier, all assessors now must value prop-
erty at its actual market value; administratively determined percent-
ages of market value can no longer be utilized."' Consequently, all
property within the state should be valued at market value."' If this
statutory mandate is heeded, substantial equality in assessment prac-
tices on a statewide basis should be achieved. Furthermore, the commis-
sioner of revenue has been given the power by the legislature to compel
local assessors to assess property uniformly"2 and can intervene to cor-
rect the assessments if the local assessors do not assess uniformly. " 3
Finally, the legislature in 1971 passed legislation requiring all assessors
to be licensed by a state board of assessors, thus ensuring that at least
(countywide equality in the same tax year not required because impracticable and impos-
sible to achieve).
172. See Dulton Realty, Inc. v. State, 270 Minn. 1, 21, 132 N.W.2d 394, 408 (1964)
(requiring equality among taxing districts, by judicial mandate, "most certainly would
result in a chaotic situation as to revenues required for the operation of various units of
our state government").
173. See Johnson v. County of Ramsey, 290 Minn. 307, 308-11, 187 N.W.2d 675, 676-77
(1971) (discussion of legislature's reaction to past suggestions by the court).
174. 270 Minn. 1, 132 N.W.2d 394 (1964).
175. Id. at 20-21, 132 N.W.2d at 407-08.
176. 301 Minn. 380, 223 N.W.2d 757 (1974).
177. Id. at 385, 223 N.W.2d at 760. Minnesota appears to be in the minority on this
issue, with the majority of cases permitting annual reassessment of less than all the
property within the assessment district. See Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 1077 (1961).
178. 290 Minn. 307, 187 N.W.2d 675 (1971).
179. See id. at 313-14, 187 N.W.2d at 678-79.
180. See notes 150-51 supra and accompanying text.
181. In actuality, most property in Minnesota is presently assessed at between 75% and
90% of market value. See 1976 AssEsSMENT/SALEs RATio STUDY, supra note 30, at 159-92.
182. See MINN. STAT. § 270.06(1) (Supp. 1977).
183. See id. § 270.06(2)-(3); id. § 270.16 (1976).
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a minimum degree of expertise is possessed by all assessors within the
state. "' This requirement should encourage more uniform statewide as-
sessment practices.'85
The measures taken by the Minnesota Legislature represent a signifi-
cant improvement. More can be done, however. A major improvement
would be to centralize more effectively the responsibility for assessing
real estate.' The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
suggests that no assessment district be less than one county in size and
that the assessment function be done on a multicounty basis in sparsely
populated areas.8 7 The purpose of such a change would be to make
assessment districts large enough to justify better trained, more special-
ized personnel to assess property.'"M With this improvement and those
already made by the Minnesota Legislature, equitable and uniform
statewide assessment practices can be realized.
2. Legislative Classifications
The Minnesota Legislature classifies real estate into different classes
and treats each class differently from the others. The primary statute
is Minnesota Statutes, section 273.13, which separates real estate into
different classes and provides that the different classes shall have taxa-
ble values of varying percentages of actual market value. 89 In addition,
other statutes either explicitly' 0 or implicitly'' classify property for
property tax purposes.
Although legislative tax classifications have been attacked relatively
184. Act of Oct. 30, 1971, ch. 31, art. 25, § 10, 1971 Minn. Laws 2647 (amended 1974,
1975, and 1977) (codified at MINN. STAT. § 270.50).
185. See, e.g., Note, Real Property Tax Assessment: A Look at Its Administration
Practices and Procedures, 38 ALB. L. REv. 498, 512 (1974). Minnesota was praised for
initiating this sytem of training and certifying assessors. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE-LocAL FINANCES: SIGNIFICANT FEATURFs AND SUGGESTED
LEGISLATION 8 (1972) (document M-74).
186. Minnesota authorizes, but does not require, valuation of property for tax purposes
to be done on a countywide basis by county assessors rather than by local assessors. See
MINN. STAT. § 273.052 (1976).
187. See ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 159, app. § 15-41-20, at 7-8 (Property Tax Organ-
ization and Administration §§ 15-16).
188. See, e.g., Back, Potential for Organizational Improvement for Property Tax
Administration, in THE PROPERTY TAX AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 35-42 (A. Lynn ed. 1969);
Note, The Michigan Property Tax: Assessment, Equalization, and Taxpayer Appeals, 17
WAYNE L. REV. 1397, 1470 (1971).
189. Classifications include iron ore (50% of market value); mobile homes (40% of
market value); agricultural homestead land (18% of market value; 16% of market value
for taxes payable after 1978); other homesteads (22% of market value; 20% of market value
for taxes payable after 1978); residential rental property (40% of market value); and all
other property not specifically classified (43% of market value). MINN. STAT. § 273.13
(Supp. 1977).
190. See, e.g., id. § 273.15 (1976) (low-grade iron ore).
191. See notes 196-200 infra and accompanying text.
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frequently on equal protection grounds, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has been extremely reluctant to strike down such classifications. "2 A
good example of the court's approach is contained in Elwell v. County
of Hennepin,"3 where the court upheld the constitutionality of the
"green acres" statute, which provides preferential assessment treat-
ment to certain agricultural land:"'
Further, the power to classify property for taxation purposes is primar-
ily with the legislature, and such laws will not be declared invalid
unless it clearly appears that they are unreasonable, arbitrary, or capri-
cious. Every presumption is invoked in favor of the constitutionality of
an act of the legislature, and we will not declare it unconstitutional
unless satisfied, after careful study, that it conflicts with some provi-
sion of the Minnesota or United States Constitution.
Thus, although the court has come down hard on unauthorized classifi-
cations by local assessors, "' it has given the legislature great leeway to
classify. Consequently, to attack a legislative property tax classification
successfully, the taxpayer must overcome the substantial burden of
proving that there are no reasonable grounds for making a distinction
between the different classes of real estate.
In general, legislative classification of property for assessment pur-
poses is justified. It allocates the tax burden based on the views of the
electorate, through its elected representatives, as to what classes of
property should bear a greater proportion of the tax burden than others,
rather than permitting this decision to be made by local assessors. So
long as the different treatment is based upon legitimate distinctions
among the classes, such classifications should be upheld. The Minne-
sota Legislature adopted a statute in 1973, however, that perpetuates
inequality and is not based on legitimate distinctions among classes of
property. Section 273.11(2), as originally adopted, limited any increase
in valuation of property for tax purposes to five percent of the previous
assessment. " The section was amended in 1975 to permit a ten-percent
increase or an increase of not more than one-fourth of the total increase
192. See, e.g., Elwell v. County of Hennepin, 301 Minn. 63, 73-76, 221 N.W.2d 538, 545-
47 (1974); In re Taxes on Property of Cold Spring Granite Co., 271 Minn. 460, 136 N.W.2d
782 (1965); State v. Donovan, 218 Minn. 606, 16 N.W.2d 897 (1944).
193. 301 Minn. 63, 221 N.W.2d 538 (1974).
194. Id. at 75-76, 221 N.W.2d at 546. The approach of the Minnesota Supreme Court
is basically the same as that taken by the United States Supreme Court. For example, in
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973), a case involving the
elimination of personal property taxes for individuals in Illinois but not for corporations,
the Court stated: "Where taxation is concerned and no specific federal right, apart from
equal protection, is imperiled, the States have great leeway in making classifications and
drawing lines which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation."Id. at 359.
195. See notes 142-45 supra and accompanying text.
196. See Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 650, art. XXIII, 1973 Minn. Laws 1682 (amended 1975
and 1977) (codified at MINN. STAT. § 273.11(2)).
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in market value from the previous assessment, whichever is greater. 97
Section 273.11(2) obviously is designed to mitigate the results that
rapidly increasing property values during an inflationary period can
have on the owner's property taxes. It also has 'the effect, however, of
causing inequality; potentially, property within the same class can have
taxable values at dramatically different percentages of actual market
value. This is so because property increasing rapidly in value is not
required to bear its proportionate share of the property tax burden when
compared to property that is not increasing in value as rapidly. 198 This
result, of course, is antithetical to the recent trend toward equality in
the property tax area. Moreover, the statute is apparently intended to
mitigate possible hardship resulting from rapidly increasing property
values, yet it makes no distinction between property owners who can
afford to pay the increased taxes and those who cannot. This distinction
is drawn in other statutes such as the income-adjusted property tax
refund legislation 9' and provisions for relief to elderly homeowners for
special assessments.2 " If rapidly increasing property values are creating
hardships in particular instances, this problem should be resolved in a
manner which provides relief only to those property taxpayers who are
in special need of the relief. As presently drafted, section 273.11(2)
paints with too broad a brush; it can operate to reduce the tax burden
of wealthy taxpayers with valuable property by shifting the tax they
would otherwise pay to owners of property that may be located in a
depressed area and is not increasing in value. Consequently, while sec-
tion 273.11(2) might be politically attractive, it perpetuates rather than
alleviates inequality and frustrates other recent attempts by the legisla-
ture to achieve equality in assessment practices.
C. Illegality
In a sense, every overvaluation or unequal assessment of real estate
is illegal, and consequently a separate section discussing illegal assess-
ments is somewhat artificial. 0' This section therefore basically repre-
197. Act of June 6, 1975, ch. 437, art. 8, § 5, 1975 Minn. Laws 1610 (amended 1977)
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 273.11(2)).
198. This is so because placing a limit on the taxable value of some property does not
reduce the total amount of tax levied by the taxing authorities. See notes 34-36 supra and
accompanying text. Therefore, because the properties given special treatment under sec-
tion 273.11(2) have to pay less tax than they otherwise would, the properties that are not
given the special treatment must pay more than they otherwise would.
199. MINN. STAT. ch. 290A (1976 & Supp. 1977).
200. Id. § 435.193 (1976) (special assessments charged to homesteads owned by elderly
persons can be deferred if payment would cause a hardship and if the local government
unit establishes a deferral program).
201. Minnesota cases and statutes do, however, refer to illegality as something different
from overassessment or unequal assessment. See, e.g., Lindahl v. State, 244 Minn. 506,
509-10, 70 N.W.2d 866, 869 (1955); MINN. STAT. § 278.01 (Supp. 1977), as amended by
Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 672, § 9, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 426 (West).
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sents a residuum, encompassing illegal assessments other than overval-
uations and unequal assessments. Specifically, the following types of
illegal assessments are discussed: (1) assessments not made in accord-
ance with statutory procedures; (2) assessments based on fraud or mis-
take; and (3) assessments based on ambiguous statutory authority.
1. Statutory Procedures Not Followed
At times taxpayers have claimed that an assessment was invalid be-
cause not performed in accordance with statutory procedures. Such a
claim generally carries little weight, especially in light of the legisla-
ture's mandate that all assessments are presumed valid and that no
assessment shall be found invalid for failure to follow statutory proce-
dures unless the taxpayer first establishes that he was prejudiced
thereby."" The court in the leading case of Lindahl v. State2 inter-
preted this legislative mandate as requiring affirmance of a technically
improper assessment so long as the taxpayer was not overassessed or
unequally assessed, and was only required to bear his fair share of the
tax burden.104 Thus, Lindahl establishes the reasonable rule that a tax-
payer cannot raise technical objections to an assessment unless he has
suffered some actual financial injury as a result of the technical deficien-
cies.
2. Fraud or Mistake
An argument sometimes is made that an assessment is invalid be-
cause of fraud or mistake. The court has followed the same practical
approach in this area as on the issue of failure to follow statutory proce-
dures. In Red Owl Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner of Taxation,2 the
supreme court held that neither fraud nor mistake is grounds for object-
ing to an assessment unless the taxpayer proves the fraud or mistake
resulted in an overvaluation or unequal assessment of his property.2"
Consequently, proof of fraud, mistake, or failure to follow statutory pro-
cedures is generally of little assistance to a taxpayer unless he can
prove, normally based on expert appraisal testimony,m that he was
damaged as a result of the transgression.
202. See MINN. STAT. §§ 272.06, 279.19 (1976).
203. 244 Minn. 506, 70 N.W.2d 866 (1955).
204. See id. at 511-13, 70 N.W.2d at 870-71.
205. 264 Minn. 1, 117 N.W.2d 401 (1962).
206. Id. at 8, 117 N.W.2d at 407.
207. See id. The court observed:
Since a taxpayer alleging mistake, fraud, or other irregularity in the assess-
ment of his lands and property must show that the assessment is discriminatory
or excessive or that the alleged wrongful act, if any, has in some way caused
financial injury to him, relator had the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that the. mistake or fraud it alleged has occurred and that it has
been damaged thereby. However, relator called no witnesses to show that the
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3. Ambiguous Authority for Assessment
Situations conceivably can arise in which the taxing authority at-
tempts to do something in the assessment process which arguably is not
authorized by statute and which could result in the taxpayer paying a
higher property tax. For example, a statute might be ambiguous as to
when the government has a right to appeal an adverse assessment rul-
ing.2 "8 In these situations the court has at times applied a general pre-
sumption that an ambiguous property tax statute is to be interpreted
in favor of the taxpayer.'" This presumption, therefore, might be of
value in cases of first impression involving interpretations of ambiguous
property tax statutes. It should be noted, however, that the court has
refused to apply the presumption where the taxpayer is seeking an ex-
emption from taxation, applying instead a presumption that all prop-
erty is subject to taxation unless an exemption clearly is available. °10
IV. PROCEDURES FOR ATTACKING PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENTS
Minnesota Statutes contain a number of procedures for objecting to
property tax assessments. These procedures are not set forth in the
statutes in a manner which is easily comprehended; they have been
described by the Minnesota Supreme Court as "antiquated and inade-
quate." '' The Minnesota Legislature has taken steps in recent years to
remedy this procedural morass, but, as will be seen, it has not yet
alleviated the confusion. 1 2 This section will discuss these procedural
statutes in the following sequence: (1) administrative review;21 3 (2) dis-
assessment was excessive or to show valuations of other similar properties in the
area.
Id.
208. See Mondale v. Commissioner of Taxation, 263 Minn. 121, 116 N.W.2d 82 (1962).
209. See, e.g., Mondale v. Commissioner of Taxation, 263 Minn. 121, 126-27, 116
N.W.2d 82, 86 (1962); State ex rel. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Minnesota Tax Comm'n,
132 Minn. 93, 99, 155 N.W. 1061, 1064 (1916).
210. See, e.g., Christian Business Men's Comm. v. State, 228 Minn. 549, 555, 38
N.W.2d 803, 809 (1949); cf. In re Estate of Abbott, 213 Minn. 289, 296, 6 N.W.2d 466, 469
(1942) (presumption in favor of taxpayer does not apply where taxpayer is seeking a
deduction).
211. Dulton Realty, Inc. v. State, 270 Minn. 1, 20, 132 N.W.2d 394, 407 (1964); accord,
Independent School Dist. No. 99 v. Commissioner of Taxation, 282 Minn. 425, 428, 165
N.W.2d 250, 253 (1969) (in interpreting the procedure for reviewing decisions of the com-
missioner of revenue and state board of equalization, the court stated its conclusion was
based on the statutes "as best we can understand these singular statutes").
212. In fact, the legislature has enacted some statutes in recent years that have added
to the confusion rather than alleviating the confusion. For example, in 1975 the legislature
passed a statute that created a special district court review process solely for mobile home
assessments, despite the existence of an adequate district court review procedure in chap-
ter 278 that could have been utilized. See Act of June 4, 1975, ch. 376, § 2, 1975 Minn.
Laws 1254 (amended 1978).
213. See notes 218-55 infra and accompanying text.
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trict court and tax court review;2"' (3) abatement process;", (4) injunc-





The administrative review process encompasses several stages, some
formal and others informal. The first stage is the most informal: a re-
quest to the assessor that he correct an error in valuation. The county
assessor, or the city assessor in any city of the first class, is authorized
to correct any errors made in the valuation of property for tax pur-
poses .2 1 The statute granting this authority is not clear as to when the
assessor can make a correction in valuation. It seems to contemplate
that the correction normally will occur prior to the meeting of the local
board of review, but the statute also states that the corrections may be
made "either before or after" the time when all assessments are com-
pleted.' Thus, the assessor conceivably can correct an error in valua-
tion at any time. Such power, however, would clash with the intricate
review process described hereafter. Moreover, after the various boards
of review and equalization have approved the accuracy of an assessment
the assessor probably would be reluctant to change the assessment un-
less the error was glaring. Consequently, an appeal to the assessor to
lower the valuation of property probably is most effective if made prior
to the meeting of the local board of review, even though the assessor
technically may have the power to alter an erroneous valuation after
that time.
2. Boards of Review and Equalization
The local board of review meets between April 1 and June 30 of the
year the assessment is made to review the assessor's valuation. 2 The
board is empowered, if petitioned by an aggrieved taxpayer, to review
the taxpayer's assessment and "correct it as shall appear just.""' This
apparently broad power to correct an assessment based on justice argua-
bly implies that the board can reduce an assessment for reasons other
than overvaluation, inequality, or illegality, such as inability to pay.
214. See notes 256-77 infra and accompanying text.
215. See notes 278-85 infra and accompanying text.
216. See notes 286-96 infra and accompanying text.
217. See notes 297-300 infra and accompanying text.
218. MINN. STAT. § 273.01 (1976).
219. Id. The assessor is to complete all assessments, except for permissible corrections,
at least two weeks before the meeting of the local board of review. Id. Not more than two
percent of the total parcels in the assessor's jurisdiction can be corrected by him there-
after. Id.
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Such a broad power, however, probably was not intended, especially in
light of the legislature's mandates that all property be valued at market
valuez and that all taxpayers receive equal treatment. 2 1 Consequently,
the taxpayer probably must prove his property was overvalued, une-
qually assessed, or otherwise illegally assessed.
The county board of equalization, which meets between the first and
the fifteenth of July,* also is empowered to correct erroneous assess-
ments.2 5 However, a taxpayer who does not petition the local board of
review for a reduction in valuation normally is precluded from seeking
relief from the county board of equalization. 2 Thus, the county board
of equalization in effect operates as an appellate board, although it is
not limited in its scope of review and can hear testimony and receive
evidence as does the local board of review.m
3. Commissioner of Revenue
The commissioner of revenue wears two hats in the assessment pro-
cess; besides acting as the commissioner, he sits as the sole member of
the state board of equalizationm and in that capacity reviews most
decisions of the county boards of equalization.2" When sitting as the
state board of equalization he is precluded from reducing any assess-
ments approved by a county board of equalization.20 However, when
sitting as the commissioner of revenue he does have the authority to
reduce assessments approved by the county boards.? 1 In fact, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court has held that the commissioner can decide at will
222. See id. § 273.11(1) (1976).
223. MNN. STAT. § 273.12 (1976) provides in part:
It shall be the duty of every assessor and board, in estimating and determining
the value of lands for the purpose of taxation, to consider and give due weight
to lands which are comparable in character, quality, and location, to the end
that all lands similarly located and improved will be assessed upon a uniform
basis and without discrimination ....
224. Id. § 274.14.
225. Id. § 274.13, subd. 1(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1977). However, the county board of equali-
zation cannot reduce the aggregate valuation of all real property within the county by
more than one percent of the aggregate valuation of the assessor and local board of review.
Id. § 274.13, subd. 1(a)(5).
226. Id. § 274.01(1)(b). The only exceptions are when the assessment was made after
the board of review met or when the taxpayer can establish that he did not receive notice
of his market value at least five days before the meeting of the board of review. Id.
227. The exact nature of the meetings of the local board of review and the county board
of equalization are not described in the statutes. However, the taxpayer may appear either
in person, by his attorney, or by written communication. Id. §§ 274.01(1)(b), .13(1)(b).
228. Id. §§ 270.11(1), .12(1) (1976).
229. Id. § 270.12. The state board of equalization meets on August 15 and reviews and
equalizes the assessments approved by the county boards of equalization and corrects any
errors made by those boards. Id. § 270.12(2).
230. Id. § 270.12, subd. 2(7).
231. Id. § 270.11(6).
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which hat he is wearing at any given time;"' therefore, even when sitting
as the state board of equalization he can reduce an assessment in his
capacity as commissioner of revenue. m A taxpayer normally can obtain
review by the commissioner only if his claim first is presented to the
county board of equalization.
2 34
4. Tax Court Review
A taxpayer who receives an unfavorable ruling from the commissioner
of revenue may take an appeal to the state tax court2 3 within sixty days
of the commissioner's order.23 The tax court, normally with one judge
sitting,27 hears the case de novo without a jury, although an optional
advisory jury can be empaneled by the court."' Venue for appeals to the
tax court from the commissioner of revenue is determined by the rules
governing venue in district courts.m5 The tax court is instructed by stat-
ute to follow the rules of civil procedure for district courts where practic-
232. See Independent School Dist. No. 99 v. Commissioner of Taxation, 282 Minn. 425,
426, 165 N.W.2d 250, 252 (1969).
233. See Village of Tonka Bay v. Commissioner of Taxation, 242 Minn. 23, 26, 64
N.W.2d 3, 6 (1954) ("[Tlhe commissioner was necessarily acting in his capacity as
commissioner since the case involved a reduction in the assessed valuation of a corpora-
tion's real estate.").
234. See MINN. STAT. § 274.13(1)(b) (Supp. 1977). The only exception is when the
taxpayer is not duly notified of the meeting of the county board of equalization. Id.
235. Id. § 271.06, as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 672, § 4, 1978 Minn. Sess.
Law Serv. 424 (West). Chapter 271 of Minnesota Statutes, relating to the Minnesota Tax
Court, is entitled "Tax Court of Appeals." Moreover, various sections in chapter 271 refer
to the court as the tax court of appeals. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 271.01 (1976 & Supp.
1977), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 672, § 1, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 423
(West). However, an obscure provision of the act creating the court changes the name of
the tax court of appeals to the tax court. See Act of May 27, 1977, ch. 307, § 29, 1977 Minn.
Laws 618. The revisor of statutes is instructed to make this name change in the 1978
volume of Minnesota Statutes. Id.
236. MINN. STAT. § 271.06(2) (Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch.
672, § 4, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 424 (West). The time period for appeal may be
extended an additional 30 days by a tax court judge for good cause, and an appeal is
perfected by serving a notice of appeal upon the commissioner of revenue and filing the
original with the tax court or district court with proof of service. MINN. STAT. § 271.06(2)
(Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 672, § 4, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law
Serv. 424 (West).
237. MINN. STAT. § 271.04 (Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 672,
§ 3, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 424 (West). Provision is made, however, for an en banc
hearing by all three tax court judges, if a majority of the court approves. MINN. STAT. §
271.04 (Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 672, § 3, 1978 Minn. Sess.
Law Serv. 424 (West).
238. MINN. STAT. § 271.06(6) (Supp. 1977).
239. Id. § 271.04, as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 672, § 3, 1978 Minn. Sess.
Law Serv. 424 (West). If the taxpayer is a nonresident of Minnesota, venue is in Ramsey
County. MINN. STAT. § 271.04 (Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 672,
§ 3, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 424 (West).
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able but also is authorized to promulgate additional rules to govern its
proceedings.4 0
Owners of homesteaded property or taxpayers with disputes involving
less than $2,500 may, at their option, appeal to a special small claims
division of the tax court. 2 ' The hearings of the small claims division are
informal and without a jury, and they are designed to provide an inex-
pensive remedy for taxpayers with smaller claims. 24 2 The decisions of the
small claims division are conclusive on the parties and cannot be further
appealed.2 3 The statute specifically provides that an appeal to the small
claims division cannot be taken unless the taxpayer first appeals to the
local board of review and the county board of equalization, except where
the commissioner of revenue determines the original assessment.2 , This
requirement also implicitly applies to most appeals from orders of the
commissioner to the regular division of the tax court, for the local and
county boards normally must review a taxpayer's complaint before the
taxpayer can appeal to the commissioner.
2 5
The present tax court was established by the 1977 legislature.2 6 It is
a full-time court consisting of three judges 27 and replaces a part-time
tax court.2" The small claims division also was established in 1977 and
240. MIN. STAT. § 271.06(7) (Supp. 1977).
In addition, for regular tax court cases a verbatim stenographic record is kept, id. §
271.07, and the tax court judge must make written findings of fact and a memorandum
explaining the reasons for his decision. Id. § 271.08. The decision must be filed by the court
within three months after the matter is submitted by the taxpayer. Id. § 271.20.
241. Id. § 271.21(2).
242. See id. § 271.21(6). A taxpayer commences an action in the small claims division
by filing a petition with the tax court clerk, in the form prescribed by the tax court,
explaining the nature of his claim. Id. § 271.21(5). The judge may receive whatever
testimony and other evidence he deems necessary or desirable, and sales ratio studies done
by the department of revenue are admissible without foundation. Id. § 271.21(6). All
testimony is received under oath, the taxpayer may appear on his own behalf or by his
attorney, and no transcript is kept of the proceedings. Id. If the small claims division
docket becomes overburdened, the tax court is empowered to appoint referees to decide
cases. Id. § 271.21(10).
. 243. Id. § 271.21(8). The judge has broad power to order a reduction in the assessment
or a refund of a tax, or to take any other necessary measures. Id. The court's decision has
no precedential value. Id.
244. Id. § 271.01(5). This requirement potentially could eliminate much of the utility
of the small claims division because the local board of review meets very soon after the
proposed assessment is first determined by the assessor. Undoubtedly, many homeowners
do not appear before the local board of review and therefore are precluded from utilizing
the route of the small claims appeal. The legislature dealt with this problem in part by
requiring that the taxpayer be notified, at the same time he is notified of his assessment,
of his right to appeal to the small claims division and of the fact that he must first appear
before the local board of review and the county board of equalization. Id. § 271.21(4).
245. See notes 226, 234 supra and accompanying text.
246. See Act of May 27, 1977, ch. 307, §§ 1-32, 1977 Minn. Laws 606 (amended 1978)
(codified at MinN. STAT. §§ 271.01-.22).
247. MINN. STAT. § 271.01(1) (Supp. 1977).
248. The legislature had created a part-time tax court in 1939. See Act of Apr. 22, 1939,
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has no previous counterpart.2 4' The creation of a full-time tax court and
a small claims division represents a potentially major reform in Minne-
sota property tax law. Valuation of property requires special expertise
of an essentially nonlegal nature; therefore, litigants should be assured
of a fair and technically sound decision by a full-time, impartial,N
specialized tax court. Moreover, the small claims division represents a
major improvement for taxpayers whose claims do not merit the expense
of a full, formal trial. Thus, with regard to appeals from orders of the
commissioner of revenue, the statute on tax court review is relatively
clear and should create few problems. However, as will be discussed in
relation to district court review,25 ' the tax court also has jurisdiction in
other property tax assessment cases and the rules and jurisdiction of the
tax court in these cases are somewhat ambiguous.
5. Supreme Court Review
Tax court decisions are appealable to the Minnesota Supreme Court
by certiorari within sixty days after notice of filing of the tax court's
decision."' The appeal is treated in the same basic manner as other
appeals to the supreme court.10 The supreme court will consider the tax
court decision prima facie validl' and will reverse only upon a clear
showing that the tax court was without jurisdiction, that the order of
the tax court was not supported by the evidence, or that the tax court
committed a prejudicial error of law.'
ch. 431, art. VI, § 10, 1939 Minn. Laws 932 (repealed 1977).
249. See Act of May 27, 1977, ch. 307, § 4,1977 Minn. Laws 607 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 271.01(5)).
250. Tax court judges are selected on the basis of experience with and knowledge of the
tax laws; they shall be nonpartisan to the extent possible, and no more than two can be
affiliated with the same political party. Id. § 2, 1977 Minn. Laws 606. When this section
of the session laws was codified, the requirements that the judges be nonpartisan and that
no more than two be affiliated with the same political party were excluded, apparently
inadvertently. See Mn'N. STAT. § 271.01(1) (Supp. 1977). Although the court is designed
to be impartial, it nonetheless is an agency of the executive branch of state government,
not the judicial branch. Id.
251. See notes 271-77 infra and accompanying text.
252. MINN. STAT. § 271.10(2) (Supp. 1977). The taxpayer must obtain a writ of certiorari
from the supreme court and serve it upon the commissioner of revenue, the attorney
general, and all parties to the tax court proceeding. Id. Moreover, the taxpayer must pay
the appeal fee and post bonds in the same manner as in the case of an appeal from district
court. Id.
253. The Minnesota Supreme Court recently held that appeals from the tax court are
appealable either under MINN. STAT. § 271.10(2) (Supp. 1977) or under Rules 115 and 125
of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. Oster & Pederson, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner of Taxation, - Minn. 266 N.W.2d 162, 164 (1978). Thus, although
the two procedures are substantially similar, the taxpayer nonetheless has an option to
appeal under either process.
254. See, e.g., Village of Burnsville v. Commissioner of Taxation, 295 Minn. 504, 508,
202 N.W.2d 653, 657 (1972) (tax court is a specialized tribunal; on appeal its decision will
be upheld if the evidence reasonably supports the tax court's determination of value).
255. MnN. STAT. § 271.10(1) (1976).
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B. District Court Review-Tax Court Review
1. District Court Review
The administrative review process described above gives the taxpayer
a number of opportunities to obtain redress for overassessments, une-
qual assessments, or other illegal assessments. The administrative pro-
cess, however, has at least one major drawback: if a taxpayer does not
object to the assessment before the local board of review, which meets
shortly after the proposed valuation is determined by the local assessor,
he normally is precluded from appealing further within the administra-
tive review process. This is so because every stage of that process usually
is predicated upon the taxpayer having presented his claim at the pre-
vious stage.2 Consequently, the requirement that the taxpayer apply
to the local board of review for a reduction in valuation, in effect, estab-
lishes an extremely short statute of limitations insofar as administrative
review is concerned. For this reason a large number of property tax
assessment cases, at least in the past, have been decided through the
district court review process.
A taxpayer may bring a district court action by serving copies of his
petition upon the county auditor, treasurer, and attorney and filing the
petition, with proof of service, in the district court prior to June 1 of the
year the tax becomes payable, 25 which is the year after the year the
assessment is made. 5 If the petition is not filed by June 1, the tax-
payer's district court remedy is forfeited.2' Moreover, the taxpayer must
pay fifty percent of the disputed tax by June 1, unless the court grants
permission to do otherwise .2 Cases are tried in the district court of the
256. See notes 226, 234 supra and accompanying text.
257. MINN. STAT. § 278.01 (Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 672,
§ 9, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 426 (West).
258. Compare MINN. STAT. § 273.01 (1976) with id. § 276.04 (Supp. 1977).
259. Id. § 278.01, as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 672, § 9, 1978 Minn. Sess.
Law Serv. 426 (West); see In re Cancellation of Ditch Assessments, 213 Minn. 70, 71-72,
5 N.W.2d 64, 65-66 (1942) (filing of petition by June 1 is a condition precedent to the
granting of the requested relief).
260. MINN. STAT. § 278.03 (1976), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 672, § 10,
1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 426 (West). To receive permission to continue the action past
June 1 without paying one-half of the taxes, or with paying a reduced amount, the tax-
payer must make the application to the court at least 10 days before June 1 and must
give the county attorney and county auditor at least 10 days notice of the application.
The taxpayer must establish that the action has been taken in good faith; that there is
probable cause to believe that the tax may be determined to be less than 50% of the
amount levied; and that payment of 50% of the amount levied would work a hardship
upon the petitioner. MINN. STAT. § 278.03 (1976), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978,
ch. 672, § 10, 1978 Minn. Seass. Law Serv. 426 (West).
If the action is not completed by November 1 of the year the tax is due the taxpayer
must then pay 50% of the remaining amount due, unless he again files an application
following the same procedure described above. MINN. STAT. § 278.03 (1976), as amended
by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 672, § 10, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 426 (West).
If payment of taxes is not made when due, the action is automatically dismissed unless
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county in which the tax was levied."' The trial is before the court, sitting
without a jury, 2' and ordinary rules of evidence and procedure are not
strictly followed as the court is instructed to disregard all technicalities
not affecting the substantial merits of the proceedings m The district
court is empowered to decide claims that the property was unequally
assessed, assessed at greater than its market value, illegally assessed, or
exempt from taxation.2"' Decisions of the district court are appealable
to the supreme court in the same manner as other district court ac-
tions."'
District court jurisdiction appears to be very broad; the taxpayer is
not required to exhaust his administrative remedies and any person with
any interest in the property can obtain district court review.nl Nonethe-
less, limitations on the district court's jurisdiction do exist. For exam-
ple, a taxpayer who appeals a decision of the commissioner of revenue
to the tax court is precluded from bringing the same action in district
court." 7 Moreover, prior to the 1977 amendments creating the new tax
court the supreme court stated, based on a former statute," s that appeal
to the tax court was the sole method for objecting to a decision of the
commissioner of revenue.269 Thus, district court review of the commis-
the court waives payment and permits the petitioner to continue the action without
payment of the taxes. MINN. STAT. § 278.03 (1976), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978,
ch. 672, § 10, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 426 (West). The court has modified this poten-
tially harsh result, however, by holding that excusable mistake or neglect are grounds for
vacating the dismissal, thus reinstating the action. See Thunderbird Motel Corp. v.
County of Hennepin, 289 Minn. 239, 240, 183 N.W.2d 569, 570 (1971).
When the taxpayer is required to pay part of the tax pursuant to section 278.03 and
prevails on the merits, he is entitled to interest on the amount of payments refunded at
six percent from the date of filing the petition for review or from the date of payment of
the taxes, whichever is later. E.g., Hedberg & Sons v. County of Hennepin, 305 Minn. 80,
94-96, 232 N.W.2d 743, 752-53 (1975).
261. MINN. STAT. § 278.01 (Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 672,
§ 9, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 426 (West).
262. See MINN. STAT. § 278.05 (Supp. 1977) ("The court shall... hear and determine
the claims, objections, or defenses made by the petition and shall direct judgment accord-
ingly .... ").
263. Id. The court is further instructed to give the case precedence over all other matters
before the court. Id.
264. Id. § 278.01(a), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 672, § 9, 1978 Minn. Sess.
Law Serv. 426 (West).
265. See MINN. STAT. § 278.13 (1976).
266. Id. § 278.01(a) (Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 672, § 9,
1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 426 (West). Unlike Minnesota, some states do require exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies before judicial review can be obtained. See, e.g., Traverse
Beach Ass'n v. Township of Elmwood, 142 Mich. 297, 298, 105 N.W. 768, 769 (1905).
267. MINN. STAT. § 271.09(1) (Supp. 1977) (all decisions of tax court, unless appealed
further to the supreme court, are final and conclusive upon all the parties as to all the
issues decided).
268. Act of Apr. 22, 1939, ch. 431, art. 6, § 18, 1939 Minn. Laws 936 (repealed 1977).
269. See Independent School Dist. No. 99 v. Commissioner of Taxation, 282 Minn. 425,
427 n.5, 165 N.W.2d 250, 252 n.5 (1969).
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sioner's decision was precluded. This statement, however, may not be
accurate in light of the 1977 legislation, and therefore the district court
now may have jurisdiction even if an appeal was taken to the commis-
sioner prior to the district court action."'
2. Tax Court Review
Besides having jurisdiction to decide assessment cases appealed from
the commissioner of revenue, the new tax court also has jurisdiction to
decide all cases that the district court is authorized to decide under
chapter 278 of Minnesota Statutes."' When the present tax court was
created in 1977 its jurisdiction in this regard was uncertain. The 1977
legislation purported to give the tax court "sole, exclusive, and final
authority" to decide all issues of fact and law arising under the state tax
laws," '2 thus suggesting that the legislation implicitly precluded district
court review under chapter 278. Other provisions of the legislation, how-
ever, indicated that district court review remained available."3 Further
confusion was added by an oblique suggestion that district courts, ap-
parently without the approval of the parties, could transfer property tax
cases to the tax court.
274
The uncertainty of the 1977 legislation was remedied by the legisla-
ture in 1978, when it amended section 278.01 to clarify that chapter 278
applies to the tax court as well as the district court."5 Taxpayers now
can bring assessment cases under chapter 278 in either the district court
or the tax court. Moreover, the rules, procedures, and time limitations
of that chapter, as outlined above for district court review, apply equally
to tax court review. The legislature in 1978 also explicitly authorized
district courts to transfer property tax cases to the tax court, apparently
270. See MINN. STAT. § 271.09(1) (Supp. 1977) ("[Ulnless an appeal is taken to the
district court, the right of appeal herein provided shall be the exclusive remedy for review-
ing the action of the commissioner of revenue .... " (emphasis added)). This section
replaced a prior provision which stated that an order of the commissioner of revenue could
be appealed only to the tax court, with no exception provided for district court actions.
See note 268 supra and accompanying text. Consequently, the inclusion of the language
concerning appeal to district court that was added by the 1977 legislation presumably was
intended to alter the prior law and provide a right of appeal of decisions by the commis-
sioner of revenue to the district court as well as the tax court.
271. See Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 672, § 9, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 426 (West)
(section 278.01 of Minnesota Statutes is amended to give tax court same jurisdiction as
district court).
272. Act of May 27, 1977, ch. 307, § 4, 1977 Minn. Laws 607 (codified at MINN. STAT. §
271.01(5)).
273. Id. §§ 15-16, 1977 Minn. Laws 612 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 271.09(1)-(2)).
274. Id. § 4, 1977 Minn. Laws 607 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 271.01(5)). Based on this
provision, the Hennepin County District Court voted to transfer its entire backlog of
property tax assessment cases to the new tax court. See Minutes of the Special Meeting
of the Judges of District Court, Hennepin County, Minnesota (August 11, 1977).
275. Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 672, § 9, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 426 (West) (to be
codified at MiNN. STAT. § 278.01).
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without first obtaining the approval of the parties."'6
The wisdom of permitting review under chapter 278 by either the tax
court or the district court can be questioned. Because of the desirability
of specialized expertise in this area, limiting appeals to the tax court
would go far to ensure uniform and fair treatment for all taxpayers.27
Moreover, it would encourage judicial efficiency, because the tax court,
with its special expertise and rules designed specifically for tax cases,
should be able to resolve assessment disputes more quickly than district
courts. Consequently, the legislature should give serious consideration
to abolishing district court review and granting only the tax court the
jurisdiction presently held by both the tax court and the district court
under chapter 278 of Minnesota Statutes.
C. Tax Abatement
Under the administrative, district court, and tax court review pro-
cesses the taxpayer has the right to have his property tax assessment
reviewed according to relatively definite legal standards. Occasions
arise, however, when a taxpayer may be precluded from obtaining relief
through these review processes. For example, the taxpayer may allow
the applicable statutes of limitations to run without objecting to the
assessment, or his property may be destroyed by fire after the January
2 assessment cutoff date.v In these situations where the taxpayer has
no legal recourse yet suffers a hardship because of a property tax or
assessment, the commissioner of revenue has broad equitable power to
reduce or "abate" the tax or assessment as he deems just.27' The com-
missioner's abatement power is purely discretionary and may be re-
viewed only for abuse of discretion.us It is designed to provide a remedy
for aggrieved taxpayers where the courts and taxing authorities cannot
276. Id.
277. See ADvisoay COMM'N, supra note 159, at 4 (Assessment Notification, Review and
Appeal Procedure Act § 5) (commission model act establishes specialized tax court to
decide assessment appeals).
278. See case cited in note 13 supra.
279. MINN. STAT. § 270.07(1) (1976) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, [the commissioner of revenue] shall have
power to grant such reduction or abatement of assessed valuations or taxes and
of any costs, penalties or interest thereon as he may deem just and equitable,
and to order the refundment, in whole or in part, of any taxes, costs, penalties
or interest thereon which have been erroneously or unjustly paid.
The policy of the department of revenue, apparently unwritten, is that it will not abate
or reduce a property tax or assessment except for taxes payable in the current year or the
two prior years. Moreover, each county has its own standards, which may permit abate-
ment for a shorter period of time than the state. Interview with Lyle Ask, Director of the
Property Equalization Division of the Department of Revenue, State of Minnesota, in St.
Paul (Apr. 4, 1978).
280. See In re Calhoun Beach Holding Co., 205 Minn. 582, 588, 287 N.W. 317, 321
(1939); In re People's Independent Tel. Co., 156 Minn. 87, 89-90, 194 N.W. 317, 318 (1923).
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legally do so.nl
To obtain an abatement the taxpayer must submit an application to
the commissioner, accompanied by a statement of facts explaining the
basis for the request.282 Moreover, the taxpayer must obtain the approval
of both the county auditor and the county board of commissioners or the
board of abatement in any city having such a board.w Consequently,
the abatement cannot be obtained without the approval of the local
taxing authorities as well as the commissioner of revenue.2
The commissioner's tax abatement power is obviously a malleable
form of relief and provides a needed remedy to avoid the injustices that
might otherwise result under the Minnesota property tax laws. Applica-
tions for abatement constitute a major portion of the petitions received
by the commissioner each year;2 the abatement process thus provides
a potentially valuable, last-chance remedy for taxpayers who have not
otherwise been able to obtain adequate relief.
D. Injunctive and Other Extraordinary Relief
Section 275.26 of Minnesota Statutes provides that a taxpayer may
obtain injunctive relief to stop the collection of illegally levied property
taxes or to have the levy corrected. At least one taxpayer has argued that
this statute permits an injunction to stop an illegal assessment, but the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Fichtner v. Schiller81 rejected the argu-
ment, holding that the statute cannot be invoked when property has
been unequally assessed or overvalued.27 The court distinguished be-
tween a levy, which refers to the legislative act of determining the total
number of tax dollars to be raised,2 and an assessment, which refers to
the valuation of property for tax purposes;2' only the former can be
enjoined under section 275.26." Thus, no statutory basis appears to
exist for obtaining extraordinary relief in property tax assessment cases
in Minnesota.
9 '
281. In re Calhoun Beach Holding Co., 205 Minn. 582, 588, 287 N.W. 317, 321 (1939).
282. MINN. STAT. § 270.07(1) (1976).
283. Id.
284. Id; see State ex rel. Foley Bros. & Kelly v. Minnesota Tax Comm'n, 103 Minn.
485, 489-90, 115 N.W. 647, 648-49 (1908) (approval of county board and county auditor is
a condition precedent to obtaining an abatement or reduction under this section); Clarke
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 66 Minn. 304, 308, 69 N.W. 25, 27 (1896) (both county board
and county auditor must recommend an abatement or reduction).
285. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 439.
286. 271 Minn. 263, 135 N.W.2d 877 (1965).
287. Id. at 267, 135 N.W.2d at 880.
288. Id. at 266-67, 135 N.W.2d at 879-80.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 267, 135 N.W.2d at 880. The court stated that the taxpayer's exclusive
remedy was under chapter 278, relating to district court review. Id.
291. See id. at 268, 135 N.W.2d at 881 (Declaratory Judgments Act is not available to
test questions of valuation and assessment in real estate tax matters). But see MNN. STAT.
§- 270.11(5) (1976) (commissioner of revenue may institute investigations of allegedly
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At various times taxpayers in Minnesota have sought extraordinary,
nonstatutory relief for allegedly unequal or excessive assessments. The
court consistently has rejected these claims, reasoning that adequate
statutory procedures exist for objecting to assessments and that these
procedures are the taxpayers' exclusive remedies 2n Thus, for example,
the court has held that injunctions,n 3 declaratory judgments,2 and
mandamus"' cannot be utilized to attack allegedly erroneous assess-
ments. Consequently, unless the taxpayer can show the statutory proce-
dures for relief are inadequate, which is extremely doubtful under pres-
ent Minnesota law,29 injunctive and other extraordinary relief is not
available.
E. Delinquent Tax Proceedings
A number of older Minnesota cases hold that the defenses of unequal,
illegal, or excessive assessments can be raised in delinquent property tax
proceedings. 7 These cases, however, are from a period when delinquent
tax proceedings were the only means by which such objections could be
raised in a judicial proceeding. In 1935, the legislature enacted chapter
278 of Minnesota Statutes,9 which grants district courts the jurisdic-
tion to review allegedly unequal, illegal, or excessive assessments before
the property tax becomes delinquent.2 9 Section 278.13 provides, in part,
that "[n]o defense or objection which might have been interposed by
proceedings hereunder shall be interposed in delinquent tax proceedings
except the defense that the taxes levied have been paid or that the
discriminatory assessment practices in the state, following complaint by a taxpayer); id.
§ 270.16 (upon complaint by taxpayer or others that considerable real estate in a taxing
district has been improperly assessed, the commissioner can order a reassessment of that
real estate if to do so would be in the best interests of the state).
292. See Larson v. Freeborn County, 267 Minn. 383, 126 N.W.2d 771 (1964); Rosso v.
Village of Brooklyn Center, 214 Minn. 364, 368, 8 N.W.2d 219, 221 (1943).
293. See, e.g., Rosso v. Village of Brooklyn Center, 214 Minn. 364, 369, 8 N.W.2d 219,
221 (1943) (chapter 278 provides adequate remedy, and therefore injunctive relief is not
available).
294. See Land O'Lakes Dairy Co. v. Village of Sebeka, 225 Minn.. 540, 548-49, 31
N.W.2d 660, 665, cert. denied, 334 U.S. 844 (1948).
295. See Evanson v. Commissioner of Taxation, 280 Minn. 559, 159 N:W.2d 259 (1968).
296. See, e.g., Larson v. Freeborn County, 267 Minn. 383, 387, 126 N.W.2d 771, 773
(1964) (taxpayer who allows statute of limitations to run under chapter 278 cannot bring
an action for equitable relief; an adequate remedy at law existed, and the taxpayer merely
failed to invoke it); Land O'Lakes Dairy Co. v. Village of Sebeka, 225 Minn. 540, 548-49,
31 N.W.2d 660, 665 (court states emphatically that chapter 278 was intended to be the
exclusive judicial remedy available to object to assessments), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 844
(1948).
297. See, e.g., County of Redwood v. Winona & St. Peter Land Co., 40 Minn. 512, 518-
19, 42 N.W. 473, 475 (1889), aff'd sub nom. Winona & St. Peter Land Co. v. Minnesota,
159 U.S. 526 (1895).
298. Act of Apr. 25, 1935, ch. 300, §§ 1-14, 1935 Minn. Laws 539.
299. See notes 256-70 supra and accompanying text.
19781
41
et al.: Grounds and Procedures for Attacking Real Property Tax Assessment
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1978
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
property is exempt from the taxes so levied." Consequently, the prior
case law allowing defenses based on overvaluation or unequal assess-
ments is no longer valid and those defenses cannot be raised in delin-
quent tax proceedings."*
V. CONCLUSION
This Note indicates that in recent years the Minnesota Supreme
Court and Minnesota Legislature have been active in the area of prop-
erty tax assessments. While this activity has resulted in many improve-
ments, it also has been incomplete and, moreover, has created some
additional ambiguities and inequities. Perhaps the best manner to sum-
marize what Minnesota has achieved in the property tax assessment
field, and what remains to be achieved, is to compare existing Minne-
sota law with suggestions that have been made to improve the property
tax assessment system.
1. A Workable Property Tax Assessment Statute. A recognized pre-
requisite to an efficient and equitable property tax assessment system
is a workable statute. 3 '0 The Minnesota statutory provisions relating to
property tax assessments do not adequately fill this need. The provi-
sions on assessments are scattered throughout a number of property tax
chapters and the review and appeal provisions are set forth in an almost
random fashion.3 Moreover, antiquated and redundant statutes remain
on the books and add confusion to an already confusing statutory
scheme.3 3 A thorough revision of Minnesota's property tax statutes cer-
tainly would not be a simple task, but, if done carefully and with recog-
nition of the procedural and substantive problems Minnesota taxpayers
presently face, it would be well worth the time and resources expended.
2. A Specialized Judicial Tribunal. The use of a specialized court to
resolve property tax assessment disputes frequently is mentioned as a
worthwhile reform.3s° Minnesota took a step in the direction of accom-
plishing this reform when it established a full-time tax court in 1977. 30
However, the legislature has retained the dual jurisdiction of the tax
300. See State v. Elam, 250 Minn. 274, 84 N.W.2d 227 (1957) (claim that property was
unequally assessed cannot be raised in delinquent tax proceedings).
301. See Back, supra note 188, at 33.
302. See MINN. STAT. § 273.01 (1976) (assessor can correct erroneous assessments); id.
§ 274.01 (Supp. 1977) (review by local board of review); id. § 274.13 (review by county
board of equalization); id. § 270.11(6) (1976) (review by commissioner of revenue); id. ch.
271 (1976 & Supp. 1977) (tax court review), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 672,
§§ 1-4, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 423 (West); MINN. STAT. ch. 278 (1976 & Supp. 1977)
(district court review), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 672, §§ 9-10, 1978 Minn.
Ses. Law Serv. 426 (West) (amended to include tax court).
303. See, e.g., notes 228-33 supra and accompanying text.
304. See, e.g., ADVIsoRY COMM'N, supra note 159, at 4 (Assessment Notification, Review
and Appeal Procedure Act § 5).
305. See notes 246-49 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 4
42
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol4/iss2/4
REAL PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENTS
court and the district court in most assessment cases,3 thus diluting the
positive effect of the new tax court. Serious consideration therefore
should be given to abolishing the district court's jurisdiction in assess-
ment cases.
3. Expertise of Assessors. A key reform is to require that assessors
have the requisite expertise to perform their jobs adequately. Two com-
plementary steps can be taken to achieve this: (1) requiring certification
of assessors07 and (2) enlarging the property tax assessment districts to
justify hiring assessors with the necessary expertise and to encourage
specialization. 0 8 The Minnesota Legislature has provided for the train-
ing and certification of assessors,1 but it has done little to enlarge
assessment districts.
3 10
4. Notice and Disclosure of Information. Notice and disclosure of
information are vital for taxpayers to determine whether they have been
improperly assessed. These reforms can be achieved by a number of
means, none mutually exclusive: require full-value assessment;"' re-
quire publication of assessment/sales ratio studies and permit their use
in proceedings to attack assessments;1 require assessors to disclose to
the taxpayer, upon request, how the assessment was determined;3 13 and
require the assessor to notify the taxpayers, in a timely manner, of the
procedures for attacking assessments."' Minnesota has taken some ac-
tion in this area, but has not attempted a comprehensive reform. The
legislature requires full-value assessments35 and has authorized the
preparation of assessment/sales ratio studies, 31 although these studies
are admissible only in specific types of cases.317 Assessors are not specifi-
cally required to make their files and records relating to determination
of assessments open to objecting taxpayers, although the legislature in
306. See notes 271-76 supra and accompanying text.
307. See, e.g., Note, supra note 185, at 512.
308. See, e.g., Note, supra note 188, at 1470. If all assessing were done at the county
level, it also would eliminate the need for a local board of review and the county board of
equalization could be the first board to review assessments and hear complaints from
taxpayers.
309. See note 184 supra and accompanying text.
310. See note 186 supra.
311. See, e.g., Aaron, supra note 152, at 156-57.
312. See, e.g., Ehrman, Administrative Appeal and Judicial Review of Property Tax
Assessments in California-The New Look, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 6-7 (1970) (discussion of
improvements made by California Legislature with suggestions for further improve-
ments).
313. Id. at 7-10.
314. See, e.g., ADVISoRY COm'N, supra note 159, at 2 (Assessment Notification, Review
and Appeal Procedure Act § 1).
315. See notes 150-51 supra and accompanying text.
316. See notes 92-93, 155-62 supra and accompanying text.
317. See MINN. STAT. § 124.212(11)(b) (Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of Mar. 28,
1978, ch. 706, § 32, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. 545 (West) (sales ratio studies only
admissible in actions brought in small claims division of tax court and in actions brought
under chapter 278 involving property described in section 273.13, subdivisions 6, 6a, 7,
7b, 10, and 12).
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1978 enacted a statute that allows a taxpayer to gain access to vital
information concerning the manner in which the valuation of his prop-
erty was determined 18 Finally, taxpayers who can appeal to the small
claims division of the tax court must be informed of the procedure for
so doing,1 ' which represents a major improvement, but other taxpayers
need not be informed of their review rights.
5. Accessibility of Meaningful Review Process. Accessibility to the
review process is important for at least two reasons. First, accessibility
maintains fairness and equality among taxpayers. Second, accessibility
reduces, to some extent, the already regressive nature of the property
tax by affording review to low-income taxpayers as well as wealthy
taxpayers3 2 The Minnesota Legislature in 1977 passed two bills to help
improve accessibility. It passed an act establishing a small claims divi-
sion of the tax court 321 and an act suggesting that homeowners can
obtain relief when their property is assessed at a more than ten-percent
variance from the local assessment/sales ratio.312 However, accessibility
is limited by other statutes and judicial decisions. For example, the
statute of limitations for administrative review of assessments, which
may be the only review process reasonably available to most taxpayers,
is unreasonably short.3 23 Moreover, taxpayers normally must pay one-
half of the disputed tax before they can obtain judicial review of an
assessment, although the statute contains provisions whereby the court
can waive this requirement. 32 ' Finally, the Hamm requirement of proof
of intent to discriminate unduly restricts the remedy for taxpayers
whose property has been unequally assessed.
3
1
This Note is intended to clarify much of Minnesota law concerning
grounds and procedures for objecting to property tax assessments. Yet,
as the above discussion indicates, a clarification of existing Minnesota
318. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 766, § 4, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 905 (West) (to
be codified at MirN. STAT. § 272.70), which classified assessor's field cards as private data
under the Minnesota Data Privacy Act. Field cards are defined as cards on which the
assessor records his observations and opinions with respect to the property he assesses.
Id. By classifying the field cards as private data, the legislature has made them available
to the objecting taxpayers but not to the public in general. See MINN. STAT. § 15.162(5a)
(1976); Note, Tortious Invasion of Privacy: Minnesota as a Model, 4 WM. MITCHELL L.
Rav. 163, 166 n.15 (1978).
319. MIN. STAT. § 271.21(4) (Supp. 1977).
320. See Ross, The Property Tax Assessment Review Process: A Cause for Regressive
Property Taxation?, 24 NAT'L TAx J. 37 (1971) (empirical study that suggests the property
tax can be rendered more regressive because generally only the wealthy with valuable
property can afford or justify using the property tax review process; consequently, they
tend to have their valuations reduced while the poorer property owners do not).
321. See notes 241-49 supra and accompanying text.
322. See notes 155-62 supra and accompanying text.
323. See text accompanying note 256 supra.
324. See note 260 supra.
325. See notes 123-32 supra and accompanying text.
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law is not sufficient; the Minnesota Supreme Court and Minnesota
Legislature must continue to make the decisions necessary to render
Minnesota law on property tax assessments both equitable and efficient.
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